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ABSTRACT 
 
WEHRUM, LYNDSAY The Bush Administration’s Torture Policy: Outright Disregard 
for the Rule of Law and Human Rights. Department of Political Science, March 2009. 
 
 
 September 11, 2001 was an infamous day in American history that shocked not 
only the U.S. but also the World; it generated turmoil and distress for the economy, 
security, citizen’s lives, and U.S. power.  The Bush administration’s response was a “war 
on terror” which involved a complete manipulation and disregard for national and 
international laws and the essential authorization of torture at U.S. controlled foreign 
detention centers.  These policies spread by moving down the “chain of command” and 
into the hands of guards and interrogators that abused, humiliated, and in some cases 
killed detainees in U.S. control. If anything, the torture response put America in graver 
danger as the country aided in tarnishing its reputation and legitimacy, in addition to 
creating further anti-American extremists.  The larger implications behind the Bush 
administration’s torture policy include the undermining of constitutional law and 
executive power, as well as the false justifications and usage of “military necessity.”  It is 
my contention that the American public needs to be informed that the Bush 
administration has undermined the law with their torture policy and that it did not provide 
actionable intelligence, but rather abused and killed individuals.  Furthermore, because of 
these actions, America has been placed in a precarious situation that the whole nation is 
left to deal with.  If the country is to learn anything, it is that violence is not the answer 
and more so that violence cannot be retaliated with greater violence or injustices.   
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Chapter 1 
Torture and Its Discontents 
 
“After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the White House made torture its secret 
weapon in the war on terror” – Alfred McCoy 
 
“The disrespect for the rule of law and the constructive role it plays both domestically 
and internationally is appalling” – Karen Greenberg 
 
 The American public received a rude awakening to the acts of torture their nation 
had been pursuing at overseas detention centers when they saw the naked, hooded, 
beaten, and bloodstained pictures from Abu Ghraib.  These pictures proved that the 
United States was in fact torturing individuals.  The U.S. has not only signed numerous 
international agreements stating torture is an illegal, inhumane, and ineffective practice, 
but was at the forefront of advocating the creation of such laws.   
 Since its founding, America has viewed itself above not just practices such as 
torture, but above other nations as well.  America perceives itself as a nation of freedom, 
liberty, and opportunity.  Unlike other nations, the U.S. escaped persecution and tyranny 
to create a country that gives people freedoms and protections such as due process and 
habeas corpus, all of which are inherent as American citizens.  While England was ruled 
by the Royal family, America has always been ruled by a democratic government chosen 
by the people, for the people.  U.S. laws and democratic principles are what have and 
continue to distinguish America from all other nations.  America is not only a nation of 
laws but a sponsor of international laws that reflect the country’s own sense of law, 
principles, and ideals.  
 Coinciding with this “castle on the hill” mentality about America and the 
country’s democratic principles and freedoms, the U.S. has also set a precedent to others 
by outlawing immoral and inhumane acts, such as torture.  In his farewell address, 
George Washington vowed that “…unlike the British, who tortured enemy captives, this 
new country in the New World would distinguish itself by its humanity” (Mayer, “Dark 
Side” 9).  In times dating as far back as the Revolutionary War, America has been in 
opposition to torture.  It is evident from President Washington’s statement that torture 
was viewed as inhumane and not an act the U.S. wanted to be associated with.   
 The first international law that declared the illegality of torture was in 1929 with 
the Third Geneva Accords.  Provisions of this accord included that prisoners “shall at all 
times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence” 
(“International Humanitarian Law” Art. 2); “No pressure shall be exercised on prisoners 
to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country. 
Prisoners who refuse to reply may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to 
unpleasantness or disadvantages of any kind whatsoever” (“International Humanitarian 
Law” Art. 5); and “The food ration of prisoners of war shall be equivalent in quantity and 
quality to that of the depot troops” (“International Humanitarian Law” Art. 1).  As this 
document reveals, nearly all aspects of a detainee’s imprisonment was regimented, with 
an overarching idea that regardless of the individual, he/she was to be treated humanely.   
   The Geneva Accords were revised in 1949, in order to “…close any loopholes, 
ensuring that all categories of people caught in international armed conflicts were 
protected from the shockingly inhumane abuse of captives…” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 85).  
One of the most important provisions of the 1949 accords was in Common Article 3 
which banned “cruel treatment, torture and outrages on personal dignity” (Sands 52).  In 
addition to Article 3, Article 13 states that “prisoners of war must at all times be 
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humanely treated,” while Article 87 bars “corporal punishment, imprisonment in 
premises without daylight and, in general, any form of torture or cruelty” (McCoy, 
“Question” 15).  These documents were created by international consensus and were 
forcefully advocated by the U.S. in order to protect all people and were meant to be 
upheld.   
 Beyond the Geneva Accords, the illegality of torture and proper treatment of 
prisoners is detailed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.S. War Crimes 
Statute, Army Field Manual 34-52, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the United 
Nations Convention against Torture.  All of these documents ban the practice of torture 
and also ban the lack of morality and principles behind torture (McCoy, “Question” 11).  
The Army Field Manual 34-52 (Intelligence Interrogation), specifically outlines the 
ineffectiveness and unlawfulness of torture stating that “physical or mental torture and 
coercion revolve around eliminating the source’s free will, and are expressly prohibited” 
(McCoy, “Question” 102).  In addition, the Army Field Manual 34-52 states that coercion 
is not an effective technique to obtain reliable information as it produces “unreliable 
results, including false confessions” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 189).  The Uniform Code of 
Military Justice is an additional legally binding agreement which prohibits U.S. forces 
from engaging in “cruelty, maltreatment, or oppression of prisoners in any way.” It 
considers both “physical assault and threats of injury as felonies, whether they were 
committed in the course of interrogation or not” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 189).   
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Definitions of Torture 
 What exactly is torture?  A major issue in all of the agreements that prohibit 
torture is there is not one concrete definition used in each.  This has caused a problem in 
having a definitive definition of torture, an issue which the Bush administration took 
advantage of.  In his book Torture and Democracy, Darius Rejali defines torture by 
referring to the United Nations Declaration against Torture which states that “torture 
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing 
him for an act he has committed, or intimidating him or other persons” (Rejali 37).  As 
Rejali later mentions, state officials are left out of this definition, a loophole meaning that 
these individuals would technically be able to engage in torture practices.  The U.S. War 
Crimes Statute, is an additional law which prohibits torture, defines it as “the act of a 
person who commits, or conspires, or attempts to commit, an act specifically intended to 
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental 
to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control for the 
purpose of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind.”  The result of committing such an 
offense is that he/she “shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of 
years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of 
death” (“Annex I” 1). 
 The Army Field Manual definition, unlike other definitions, does not explicitly 
state physical or mental actions but defines torture simply as “the infliction of intense 
 4
pain to body or mind to extract a confession or information” (McCoy, “Question” 102).  
Torture researchers Jane Mayer and Philippe Sands use the 1984 Convention Against 
Torture (CAT) to define torture in their books, The Dark Side and Torture Team.  “In the 
definition of torture, three elements had to be satisfied: the act must intentionally inflict 
‘severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental’; it must be intended to obtain from 
the detainee or third person information or a confession; and it must be inflicted by, or at 
the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official” (Sands 169).  
Of all the agreements, the CAT is the most concrete in its specifications and wording to 
completely prohibit torture.  The CAT stresses that there are “no circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency,” that could be “invoked as a justification of torture” or “other 
acts of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment” used to get prisoners to divulge 
information” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 150).  As the CAT reveals, there are no loopholes in 
this definition, as it clearly states that torture is banned “absolutely.”  The CAT came to a 
head in 1988 when President Reagan sent the agreement to Congress with the words “our 
desire to bring an end to the abhorrent practice of torture” (McCoy, “Question” 100).  
The State and Justice Departments under the Reagan administration wanted to clarify any 
uncertainties in the CAT and further defined psychological torture as: “Prolonged mental 
harm caused by…(1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical 
pain or suffering; (2) the administration…of mind-altering substances…; (3) the threat of 
imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to 
death…or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality” 
(McCoy, “Question” 100).  The leading researchers of torture Alfred McCoy, Jane 
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Mayer, and Darius Rejali, who use these same documents to define torture in their books, 
are in a general consensus that torture is an act that inflicts severe pain or suffering, is 
cruel, inhumane, and/or degrading, and most importantly, is banned absolutely.   
 The Bush administration’s manipulation and rewriting of national and 
international laws in regards to interrogation methods, began with creating a new 
definition of torture.  In a document written on August 1, 2002 by the Office of Legal 
Council but primarily by John Yoo and Jay S. Bybee, they stated that in order for an act 
to qualify as torture, there must be “the intent to inflict suffering ‘equivalent in intensity 
to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of 
bodily function, or even death’” (“I. Official Sanctions” 3).  Bush’s legal team 
additionally stated that “there is (a) significant range of acts that though they might 
constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of 
torture” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 152).  Top officials, advisors, and lawyers chose to avoid 
using the word “torture” because it is not only a term with a negative and harsh 
connotation, but was also an act which was and is prohibited.  In place of the word 
“torture,” the Bush administration used euphemisms such as “enhanced interrogations, 
robust interrogations, and special interrogations” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 151), alternative 
words for the same activity.  The government’s definition of torture included further 
provisions, such that in order to “qualify as torture, the infliction of pain had to be the 
‘precise objective’ of the abuse, rather than a by-product” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 152).  In 
documents written by Yoo and Bybee to government officials regarding interrogation and 
the definition of torture, both policymakers quoted the Torture Convention’s definition 
adding emphasis to one word, “severe pain or suffering.”  Their main argument being that 
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the Torture Convention’s definition of torture was open to interpretation as it did not 
specify the term “severe”” (Brooks 1).  It can therefore be assumed that the OLC was 
searching for loopholes in the definitions of torture in order to create their own, loose, 
definition, which in reality was permitting the practice of torture.  From the photographs, 
medical reports, autopsies, journal reports, books, and testimonies, all which detail the 
practices, abuses, treatment, and torture that occurred, it appears as if the OLC’s way to 
“redefine” torture was actually a maneuver in which to allow the outlawed practice.  
What policies regarding the issue of torture and interrogation of detainees were being 
created behind closed doors in the U.S. government after September 11, 2001?    
 
“War on Terror” 
 
 The atrocities against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 shocked, awed, and 
threatened the country and its people, its safety, economy, and power, in a matter of 
minutes.  The smoke, dust, debris, and bodies from that infamous day will forever be 
embedded in the American public’s hearts and memories.  Two of the most prominent 
buildings and symbols in America were destroyed, contributing to the 2,752 lives taken 
that day (Hirschkorn 1).  The attacks against America were so well calculated and caused 
such immense destruction, that the country was in a panic about what could be next?  The 
U.S. was in a state of emergency and overcome with fear, sadness, and anger and many 
felt that action and revenge needed to be taken to reclaim America’s status and safety.  
The Bush administration was frantic because for the first time in American history, the 
country was attacked on its own soil and they knew nothing.  The terrorist attack was a 
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complete surprise and U.S. intelligence had failed.  The administration was responsible 
and therefore needed to protect itself and its citizens from the possibility of a second 
wave and sleeper cells.  The White House also needed to prepare for the possibility of 
further attacks and weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological 
weapons.  Knowledge is power, and the U.S. needed knowledge and facts, fast.   
 Immediately, two models concerning ways to respond to the attacks emerged: the 
criminal justice model and the “war on terror” model.  The criminal justice model or 
police response was investigative: including finding individuals believed to be terrorists 
or dangerous to the U.S., accumulating evidence and information against these people, 
trying them in a court of law, and if found guilty, imprisoning them so they are no longer 
a danger to America or other countries.  The major setback to the criminal justice model 
is that although it is safer, it is very time consuming work, time that the administration 
felt they did not have and could not spare.  More importantly, the U.S. would need to 
greatly guard sources and methods to keep their police work completely hidden.  If for 
instance, a suspected terrorist with evidence built up against him were to be tried in a 
criminal court, the manner in which the U.S. accumulated the information would need to 
be disclosed.  Divulging this secret could put the country in greater danger as future 
terrorists or enemies could then discover techniques to block U.S. investigation methods.   
 The second model was the administration’s response, a “war on terror,” which 
involved military action.  This included finding as many people as possible that could be 
threats to the U.S. and doing whatever necessary to get information from them.  
According to the History News Network, on September 11, 2001, President George W. 
Bush issued his White House staff secret orders, saying, “I don’t care what the 
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international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass” (McCoy, “History” 5).  Five 
days later, Vice President Dick Cheney, on Meet the Press said, “We’ve got to spend 
time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will 
have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are 
available to our intelligence agencies, if we’re going to be successful” (“I. Official 
Sanctions” 2).  From these statements by the two highest ranking officials in the country, 
it can be seen how the pattern of the U.S. government acting “in the shadows” and 
against international agreements all began.  
 It was determined that the terrorist attacks were carried out by al-Qaeda and the 
government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, who gave aid and shelter to al-Qaeda.  Both, as 
it was decided, had to be destroyed and eliminated.  The U.S. had knowledge of al-Qaeda 
training camps in Afghanistan and that there were thousands of non-Afghani foreign 
fighters in training, including Yemenis, Saudis, Algerians, and Egyptians.  The problem 
with this was that these people were being trained by al-Qaeda, while at the same time 
protected by the Afghan government at the time, the Taliban.  With knowledge of 
enemies in Afghanistan, the U.S. began what the Bush administration dubbed, “the fight 
against terrorism,” with the invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001, known as 
“Operation Enduring Freedom.”   
 At the onset of the Afghanistan invasion, in order for the U.S. to win quickly, the 
Bush administration had to discover who exactly al-Qaeda and the Taliban were and each 
individual’s level of responsibility for the attacks, both of which they could not answer.  
People were quickly under American control, either through capture by the U.S. or other 
forces, handed over to the U.S. by figures such as warlords, and even paid bounties for by 
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the U.S.  These people were thought to be America’s enemy, and from this stemmed 
three crucial questions: 1) What classification will these individuals fall under in regards 
to U.S. and international doctrines? 2) Where should these individuals be detained once 
captured, and 3) How will they be dealt with, in terms of interrogation practices, 
confinement, and treatment while detained by the U.S.?   
 
Manipulating the Law 
 
 The first crucial issue the U.S. had to face once they were holding individuals 
captive was how to classify them.  The U.S. government knew the exact provisions of the 
domestic and international agreements and that the legal spirit and letter of the laws 
banned torture absolutely.  There were no gray areas or loopholes in these definitions 
through which torture was permitted or was remotely accepted.  Therefore, the only way 
in which the White House could make torture part of their policy, was the complete 
distortion and manipulation of established laws.  The Bush administration violated the 
law but in an effort to cover themselves, created their own definition of torture and 
rewrote the law by declaring “the military no longer needed to follow Geneva’s rules in 
their handling of Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 123).  This order 
became effective on January 11, 2002, “when the first Afghan captives started arriving at 
the Pentagon’s prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba” and “Rumsfeld denied them legal 
status as prisoners of war: “Unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the 
Geneva Convention” (McCoy, “Question” 114).  Classifying the detainees under this new 
status meant that laws which were created to protect prisoners of war did not apply to the 
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“unlawful combatants.”  This resulted in the Bush administration believing that extended 
policies and interrogation methods were permitted.  Furthermore, although torture and 
practices that could amount to torture are banned in countless legal agreements, torture 
was still able to enter the U.S. government and penetrate through the walls of detention 
centers, black sites, secret prisons, and other detainee prisoner camps because of the 
administration’s violations.  Gonzales’ justification for this action was that it would 
“…preserve the U.S.’s ‘flexibility’ in the war against terrorism” (“I. Official Sanctions” 
2).   
 On the same day President Bush declared that these individuals would not be 
granted the rights listed in the Geneva Accords, he stated that the “…United States 
Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely…so long as it was consistent 
with ‘military necessity’” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 125).  The 1984 Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, specifically 
states that there are “no circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of 
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,” that could be “invoked 
as a justification of torture” or “other acts of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment” 
used to get prisoners to divulge information” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 150).  As mentioned 
before, this would therefore nullify the Bush administration’s justification of “military 
necessity.”  Legal advisor to Colin Powell, William Howard Taft IV, warned about the 
U.S.’ actions in overriding the Geneva Conventions, remarking that “if the United States 
took the war on terror outside the Geneva Conventions, not only could U.S. soldiers be 
denied the protections of the Conventions-and therefore be prosecuted for crimes, 
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including murder-but President Bush could be accused of a “grave breach” by other 
countries…” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 123). 
 Once America’s enemy received the new classification as “unlawful combatants,” 
which was not in accordance with international laws, the next crucial question was where 
to detain these individuals?  (This question will be answered in detail in Chapter two).  
Therefore, the final question to answer was how to treat these people that were now under 
U.S. control, given that they may have information and/or be a threat to America.  This 
answer was also becoming even more precarious over time as the US government had 
captured people but had yet to receive any useful information.  Part of the solution came 
in August of 2002, when one of the leading individuals in drafting documents that 
essentially legalized torture, Jay Bybee, stated that “torturing al-Qaeda detainees in 
captivity abroad ‘may be justified,’ and that international laws against torture ‘may be 
unconstitutional if applied to interrogations’ conducted in the war on terrorism” (“I. 
Official Sanctions” 3).  The OLC declared that the President “had inherent powers to 
order any interrogation technique he chose and under this interpretation, U.S. laws and 
treaties banning torture-despite having been signed into law by earlier Presidents-were 
deemed unconstitutional and therefore null” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 152).  According to 
John Yoo, there were special conditions in regards to torture and the President’s power 
when he stated “Congress doesn’t have the power to ‘tie the President’s hands in regard 
to torture as an interrogation technique…The only way to block a President from 
torturing, Yoo argued, was to impeach him ” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 153).  All of these 
statements point to the fact that torture was going to be the answer to the third question of 
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“how to deal with these captured individuals in terms of interrogation practices, 
confinement, and treatment while detained by the U.S.   
 
“Military Necessity” 
 
 The Bush administration used the term “military necessity” as one of the 
legitimizations for overriding its national security codes.  Military necessity is seen when 
Diane Beaver, a former officer in the U.S. Army, backed the administration’s requested 
techniques by saying that: “To ensure the security of the United States and its allies, more 
aggressive interrogation techniques…may be required in order to obtain information from 
detainees that are resisting interrogation efforts and are suspected of having significant 
information essential to national security” (Sands 66).  The military necessity explanation 
also stemmed from officials fearing that “…detainees know when the next attack would 
happen and that they would miss vital information” (Sands 88).  To protect the U.S. and 
its citizens, government officials felt that further techniques than those already 
established in doctrines such as the Army Field Manual and Geneva Accords were 
necessary.  The Bush administration has argued that military necessity can override 
international laws and regulations if the benefit outweighs the cost.  Recall the lawfulness 
or rather unlawfulness behind this argument from the 1984 Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which stresses that 
there are “no circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency,” that could be “invoked as a 
justification of torture” or “other acts of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment” used to 
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get prisoners to divulge information” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 150).  This would therefore 
rule the administration’s justification of “military necessity” as not applicable in regards 
to torture.  
 Past circumstances when military necessity justifications were used are given in 
Michael Walzer’s, Just an Unjust Wars.  One example of an “emergency situation” that 
overrode laws and codes of morality was Britain’s decision to bomb German cities in 
order to fight Nazism.  The situation was labeled as a “supreme emergency, where one 
might well be required to override the rights of innocent people and shatter the war 
convention” (Walzer 259).  Walzer explained that risking lives to save others and 
overriding established laws, must before all else, be examined from all angles and be a 
very calculated decision.   
 The U.S. justifications for extended interrogation techniques was based on the 
issue that America was in a precarious situation that it had never been faced with before.  
Protection for the country and its people became an utmost concern for many Americans.  
The need for fast, actionable intelligence was thought to be a means to achieve this goal.  
The U.S. government’s solution to fast intelligence was by extending interrogation 
techniques beyond those already listed in the Army Field Manual and a “war on terror.”  
It has been stated however by the CAT that “no circumstances whatsoever…” could be 
“invoked as a justification of torture” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 150).  Therefore, although the 
U.S. government has a duty to protect its people, it also has a duty to uphold American 
and international laws, both of which it failed to accomplish.    
 In answering the three crucial questions America was faced with, all of the 
solutions led the government to harsher interrogation techniques.  Chapter two sets out to 
 14
explain exactly what these techniques and policies were that the Bush administration 
created.  It will also detail how the Bush administration’s policies were applied to the 
“war on terror” and moved beyond the oval office and secret meetings and into the hands 
of the guards, soldiers, MPs, contractors, MIs, the CIA, and interrogators in U.S. 
controlled detention centers and interrogation rooms.  
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Chapter 2 
 
“Harsh Interrogations” and Detainment 
“More than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries. Many 
others have met a different fate. Let’s put it this way: They are no longer a problem to the 
United States and our friends and allies” - President George W. Bush, State of the Union 
Address, January 28, 2003. 
 
 With the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States was quickly capturing 
Afghans and foreign fighters; in addition, various Afghan warlords, militias, and 
Northern Alliance leaders were handing Afghans and foreign fighters to the U.S.  
Questions quickly arose such as: Are these people terrorists and do they have any 
information for the “war on terror?”  In order to answer these questions effectively, the 
U.S. had to first decide where to detain these Afghans and foreign fighters.  In his book 
Descent into Chaos, Ahmed Rashid explains that “the Americans introduced at least six 
different systems of holding prisoners and then encouraged their allies in the region to do 
the same. These systems included “the main holding area at Guantanamo, jails at Bagram 
and Kandahar, a dozen secret sub-jails at U.S. firebases in the Afghan mountains where 
the SOF (Special Operation Forces) held their own prisoners, jails run by Afghan 
warlords and by General Fahim’s intelligence service, jails run by the (Pakistani) ISI, 
and, finally, the process of “rendition” by which the CIA transported and tortured by 
local intelligence agencies” (Rashid 298).   
 The first two kinds of imprisonment, the main holding area at Guantanamo Bay 
and jails at Bagram and Kandahar, which in addition to Abu Ghraib (which will each be 
discussed later in the chapter), are the four main U.S. controlled overseas detention 
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centers.  The third group consists of secret sub-jails which had their own set of rules and 
policies for interrogations.  These sub-jails were controlled by the U.S. and referred to as 
“black sites” because their exact location and practices at the sites were kept completely 
secret.  The majority of these sites were under Egyptian control and usually held 
suspected “high-value” detainees where the truth extraction techniques were generally far 
greater than many of the methods practiced at detention centers.   
 The fourth type of imprisonment consists of jails run by Afghan warlords, which 
was a practice that began at the start of the U.S. occupation in Afghanistan.  During 
October-November 2001, much of the capturing and holding of detainees was done by 
warlords, often notorious figures known for their thievery, torture, and cruel abuses of 
power.  The warlords’ connection to the U.S. and their treatment is understood in that 
“until the summer of 2003, warlords and commanders on the U.S. payroll also maintained 
their own prisons, often holding them on behalf of the Americans. In Herat, the warlord 
Ismael Khan frequently used torture. Prisoners described how “beatings, hanging upside 
down, whipping and shocking with electrical wires attached to the toes and thumbs” were 
commonplace” (Rashid 307).  Rashid also divulges practices by one of the most infamous 
warlords, Abdul Rashid Dostum, explaining how U.S. Special Operation Forces and the 
CIA “…tolerated unprecedented abuse, torture, and death of Taliban prisoners at the 
hands of commanders such as General Dostum” (Rashid, 297).  Warlord, Abdul Rasul 
Sayyaf, was also known for his harsh treatment of prisoners and controlled “several 
prisons just outside Kabul” and nearly all “…warlords terrorized civilians, knowing they 
would never be reprimanded by the Americans” (Rashid 307).  Although the warlords 
were in close connection with the CIA, they had their own discretion on who was 
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detained and what was done to these individuals.  These centers lasted one year at the 
most, and there is little information known about them, except that there was minimal 
oversight and accountability, which often led to detainee abuse, torture, and death.  
 The fifth type of imprisonment was jails run by Pakistani ISI, though little has 
been revealed about them.  The sixth kind of imprisonment was the process of rendition, 
the secret capture of suspected dangerous individuals and transporting them to countries 
where extraordinary interrogation practices were issued by the American CIA.   
 In addition to U.S. run detention centers, “black sites” or secret prisons, were also 
sites where torture authorized by the White House occurred.  “Black sites” were 
controlled by the CIA and also meant for rendered prisoners controlled by third country 
interrogators with CIA assistance.  “Black sites” were also the solution to the CIA’s 
search for a location that provided “total isolation, total secrecy, and total control” needed 
for “high-value” detainees (Mayer, “Dark Side” 147).  The locations of these black sites 
are “known to only a handful of officials in the United States and, usually, only to the 
President and a few top intelligence officers in each host country” (Priest 1).  The CIA 
performed nearly all of the interrogations at these “black sites” which were located either 
in undisclosed countries or in secret prisons often within other detention facilities.  
However, as of 2005, the CIA had yet to “even acknowledge existence of its black sites” 
(Priest 1).  Mayer explains that “black sites” were ways to make people “disappear” 
(Mayer, “Dark Side” 148), in that the individuals and their families were often unsure 
where they were or the reason for their capture.  The process of rendition and securing 
locations for “black sites” went beyond U.S. involvement to include “at least a dozen 
countries” that provided “the United States secret detention facilities for rendered 
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prisoners, including Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, 
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Uzbekistan” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 148).  
One of the largest contributing factors for these nations’ involvement was financial 
incentive and help from the U.S. to “join NATO if they helped us (U.S.) torture people” 
(Mayer, “Dark Side” 148).  
 The Salt Pit is one of the few revealed “black sites.”  Located outside of Kabul, 
Afghanistan, the Salt Pit was closed in November 2002 due to the “…death of an Afghan 
detainee…who froze to death overnight after having been stripped naked, was buried, and 
kept “off-the-books” (“The Salt Pit” 2).  Similar to many of the other “black sites,” the 
Salt Pit was guarded by Afghan troops but “…financed entirely using CIA funds, 
covering salaries, maintenance and electricity, among others” (“The Salt Pit” 1).  The 
U.S. was not able to fully control the actions at the Salt Pit because of the Afghans’ 
position, but was still connected because of their financial backing.  Other possible 
known “black sites” included one in Thailand (shut down after its existence was revealed 
in 2003), a small site located at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (reportedly closed in 2004), and 
a Soviet-era compound located in Eastern Europe (“The Salt Pit” 2).    
 “Black sites,” sites run by warlords, or ones involved in rendered operations, were 
difficult to obtain information from because of the secrecy of their locations and the 
practices that occurred inside their walls.  The CIA was also in control of many of these 
operations, an organization outside the “chain of command,” meaning they did not have a 
higher authority to report to.  This meant that the CIA had the greatest flexibility with 
interrogations with the least amount of oversight.  For this reason, the CIA predominately 
dealt with “high-value” detainees, those that required the harshest interrogation methods.  
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Concerns about the CIA’s covert operations were raised by Tyler Dumheller, former 
Chief of European Operations at the CIA, who remarked: “The agency had no experience 
in detention. Never. But they insisted on arresting and detaining people in this program. It 
was a mistake, in my opinion. You can’t mix intelligence and police work. But the White 
House was really pushing” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 145). 
 
“Unlawful Combatants”  
 
 Once the U.S. began capturing and detaining individuals in different sites, it 
became clear that the country was unsure exactly who the individuals were under their 
control.  Many of these people were handed over to the U.S. by unknown individuals, by 
warlords, through bounty payments, through grudges, and the U.S. did not know who 
many of them were.  On top of this, many of the individuals initially refused to talk or 
there were interpreters that could not speak the language, meaning the U.S. could not 
research who exactly they had.  The McClatchy investigation, an eight month long 
investigation that revealed many of the prisoner abuses and issues at U.S. controlled 
detention centers, uncovered that “…many of the detainees posed no danger to the United 
States or its allies” (Lasseter, “Day 1” 1) and that the U.S. often imprisoned people 
wrongly and “on the basis of flimsy or fabricated evidence, old personal scores or bounty 
payments” (Lasseter, “Day 1”).  The investigation exposed that shortly after the opening 
of Guantanamo Bay, the White House knew that many of the prisoners did not have 
valuable information to divulge (Lasseter, “Day 1” 3).  Perhaps some of this reason 
resulted in the fact that “…most of the prisoners at Guantanamo weren’t terrorist 
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masterminds but men who were of no intelligence value in the war on terrorism” 
(Lasseter, “Day 1” 3).  Despite these findings and the “…uncertainty about whom they 
were holding, US soldiers beat and abused many prisoners” (Lasseter, “Day 1” 2).     
 In terms of the actual number of detainees that were wrongly imprisoned or do not 
have knowledge that could assist the U.S. in the “war on terror,” they vary.  If the 
information was available as to who is useful and what each individual knows, than far 
less people would be imprisoned and greater information would perhaps be known.  As 
of February 2009, this is not the case but estimates have been made: “If you say over the 
course of Afghanistan, GITMO, and Iraq, we’ve detained 50,000 people, I would say less 
than 1 percent were terrorists” (Gibney).  Former secretary of the Army, Thomas White, 
said that “from the moment that Guantanamo opened in early 2002…it was obvious that 
at least a third of the population didn’t belong there” (Lasseter, “Day 1” 3).  The 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal in 2004 revealed that the “…government believes 
only 10 percent of the more than five hundred prisoners at Guantanamo were fighters” 
(Rejali 510).  A senior intelligence analyst who was “fluent in Arabic and expert on 
Islamic extremism” was sent to Guantanamo by the CIA to discover why information 
was not being obtained (Mayer, “Dark Side” 183).  He reported that “after spending 
several hours with each of about two dozen Arab-speaking detainees… an estimated one 
third of the prison camp’s population of more than 600 captives…had no connection to 
terrorism whatsoever” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 183).  These issues posed great problems in 
categorizing detainees in terms of the information they could have and their potential 
threat.  Discovering who was a “high-value” detainee and who was not, and consequently 
which individuals should be interrogated and treated at the highest levels, was therefore 
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extremely difficult.  Records of detainees and information about them were also very 
difficult to obtain with language barriers and the facts presented.  Mayer writes how 
when the “White House staff had asked to see the prisoners’ files, they had been 
astounded to discover that for some detainees, there were no details of any sort. Not even 
a name” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 183).    
 
The Bush Administration Torture Policy 
 
 In the fall of 2002, during the same time most of these detention centers and 
“black sites” were being established, the U.S. government was pushing the limits even 
further in regards to changing the established rules about prisoner treatment and torture.  
The Bush administration was nearing a point where they had detainees in their control, 
places to hold them, and was then faced with what to do with them, in order to extract 
useful information.  It was thought by many in the White House, especially those in the 
“war council,” Addington, Bybee, Yoo, Flanigan, and Gonzales, that the only way for the 
country to obtain this information was to extend interrogation methods.  In extending 
interrogation methods, the administration declared on January 9, 2002 that “…the 
Geneva Accords and the U.S. War Crimes Act did not apply to the Afghanistan conflict” 
(Jaffer and Singh 114).  After this decision, extended interrogation methods were created 
by members of the “war council” such as “…gouging a prisoner’s eyes out, dousing him 
with scalding water, corrosive acid, or caustic substance, or slitting an ear, nose, or lip, or 
disabling a tongue or limb”(Mayer, “Dark Side” 230).   
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 The justifications that Yoo gave for such cruel practices were that laws did not 
apply during times of war and the need for national security: “…the Nation’s right to 
self-defense has been triggered by the events of September 11.  If a government 
defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that 
might arguably violate a criminal prohibition…he would be doing so in order to prevent 
further attacks on the United States…in that case we believe that he could argue that the 
executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his 
actions” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 230).  The OLC also tried to increase the role of 
prerogative power by stating that "the only way to block a president from torturing…was 
to impeach him" (Mayer, “Dark Side” 153).  Checks and balances, cores of the U.S. 
governmental system, that were supposed to occur, never did, and the established laws 
and policies that were meant to be upheld by the Bush administration never were.   
 The commander of Guantanamo Bay interrogations, Major General Michael 
Dunlavey, requested going beyond the established interrogation practices in the Army 
Field Manual 34-52 in October of 2002 (Jaffer and Singh 46).  One of the explanations 
for this request was that the manual “…hadn’t been updated since 1992” (Sands 61).  The 
result was that eleven months after the terrorist attacks, General Dunlavey requested three 
categories of techniques, “Category I, characterized by two techniques, yelling and 
deception…Category II included twelve techniques aiming at humiliation and sensory 
deprivation. Stress positions like standing for a maximum of four hours. Falsified 
documents. Isolation for up to thirty days. Interrogation out of the standard interrogation 
booth. Deprivation of light and stimuli. Hooding during transportation and questioning. 
Twenty-hour interrogations. Removal of religious and all other comfort items. Switching 
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away from hot rations to “meals, ready-to-eat.” Removal of clothing. Forced grooming, 
such as shaving of facial hair. And the use of individual phobias, like fear of dogs to 
induce stress…Category III: the use of ‘mild, non-injurious physical contact,’ like 
grabbing,  poking, light pushing; the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee 
that death or severely painful consequences were imminent for him or his family; 
exposure to cold weather or water; and finally the use of a wet towel and dripping water 
to induce the misperception of suffocation…the documents detailing these techniques 
said nothing about limits on their use over time” (Sands 4-5).  This lengthy document was 
then approved by Rumsfeld on which he wrote the infamous line, “I stand for 8-10 hours 
a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours” (Sands 5)?  Before October of 2002, the “war 
council’s” extended techniques officially began being practiced when Rumsfeld 
authorized the use of these interrogation methods at Guantanamo Bay, including 
“isolation for thirty days at a time, twenty-hour interrogations, stress positions, removal 
of clothing, hooding, and exploitation of individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to 
induce stress” (Jaffer and Singh 47).  It was therefore evident that top figures in the 
administration were not only fully aware, but were integral actors in the creation of 
actions that were in violation of established laws and documents.   
  There is also evidence which suggests that top officials in the administration 
were well informed of the practices at each detention center and in some cases were 
consulted about specific orders and detainees.  This is apparent from a “sworn statement 
to military investigators, Major General Dunlavey, who was the base’s commander in 
Guantanamo...described close and constant contact between himself and Rumsfeld 
….Dunlavey said he was asked to fly up to Washington every week to brief Rumsfeld in 
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person on the intelligence program in Guantanamo… ‘the directions changed and I got 
my marching orders directly from the President of the United States’” (Mayer, “Dark 
Side” 193).  Although the administration is not guilty of directly abusing detainees, they 
created and handed down the torture orders while remaining fully aware and involved in 
the abusive and humiliating treatment at detention centers.   
 It was not until December of 2002 that concerns were finally being raised that 
these new interrogation techniques were illegal and could put the U.S. and others in great 
danger.  The first objections came from the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit, members of 
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Alberto Mora, General Counsel of the U.S. 
Navy (Jaffer and Singh 48).  In response to these concerns, Rumsfeld “withdrew the 
December 2002 interrogation directive” and had a working group “review permissible 
interrogation methods” (Jaffer and Singh 48).  With minimal opposition to the “torture 
memos” officials made weak attempts to comply and made it clear that their directives 
were final, regardless of the law.  This is apparent in the December 2002 directive from 
Mora and Rumsfeld’s response that “the working group would ultimately support the 
kinds of interrogations that military interrogators had already been conducting” at 
overseas detention centers (Jaffer and Singh 14).     
 Requests to go beyond the already extended interrogation methods continued to 
occur when on August 14, 2003 “interrogators in Iraq are invited to submit a ‘wish list’ 
of techniques that might be used against their prisoners,” with some requests including 
“phone book strikes,” “muscle fatigue inducement,” “close quarter confinement,” and 
even “low voltage electrocution” (Jaffer and Singh 50).  Added to this list of torture 
methods, was a request by OLC member, Steven Bradbury, who drafted a secret memo in 
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2005 that increased CIA interrogation limits even further to include “…waterboarding, 
head and belly slapping, sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, temperature extremes, 
and stress positions…”(Mayer, “Dark Side” 309).  As the “war council” explained, 
however, the disregarding of international law was acceptable because of the necessity to 
protect America in the emergency situation after September 11, 2001.  However, in this 
state of emergency, prerogative power could essentially be ever present, which by the 
“war council’s” justification, would give the executive branch continual and unlimited 
power.   
 
The Detention Centers 
 
 During the time that this extended interrogation policy was being created, 
individuals were being captured by the U.S., handed over to the U.S., or paid bounty 
payments for.  Once in U.S. control, they could be placed in one of the six holding 
categories explained at the beginning of chapter two or held at one of the U.S. detention 
centers such as Kandahar or Bagram, Afghanistan; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and later 
Abu Ghraib, Iraq.  One of the first known detention centers was in Kandahar, 
Afghanistan, taken over by the U.S. during “Operation Enduring Freedom.”  Kandahar 
was set up by “…U.S. Task Force 500, at the airport outside the city” (Rashid 298).  
Being one of the first established detention centers since the newly extended interrogation 
methods, Kandahar was under great pressure from the Bush administration to produce 
actionable information (Rashid 300).  Kandahar was also the first detention center at 
which these new methods were introduced, which often created many institutional 
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problems.  Conditions in Kandahar were very poor and disorganized, on top of the 
pressing issue that no useful information was being gained from the prisoners, resulting 
in the closing of the facility in 2002.  The situation did not improve for these prisoners 
however as they were transferred to Bagram, another U.S. controlled detention center 
(Rashid 300).  (Kandahar was reopened in 2003 after the Taliban resurgence began).   
 The Bagram detention center, also known as the Bagram Air Base, was located in 
Afghanistan, thirty miles outside of Kabul, and previously served as a Soviet airstrip 
(Lasseter, “Day 1” 2).  The guards at Bagram from the summer of 2002 to the spring of 
2003 were all “reservists from the 377th Military Police Company…and many of the 
military intelligence interrogators serving at the same time were from the Utah Army 
National Guard” (Lasseter, “Day 2” 8).  Conditions were described as “equally abysmal” 
as Kandahar in that there were “chains jangling between prisoners’ ankles; gates and 
latches slamming and locking; violent shouts from interrogators” and where “the United 
States held many of its two hundred to three hundred high-value detainees” (McCoy, 
“Question” 125).  Conditions and prisoner abuses at Bagram were said to be the worst 
from the summer of 2002 to the spring of 2003, during which time the first reported 
deaths occurred in December of 2002 (Lasseter, “Day 1” 2).   
 Disorganization, understaffing, and poor conditions were issues not confined to 
Kandahar and Bagram, but problems that spread to each of the detention centers 
controlled by the U.S.   A detention center was constructed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 
less than 87 hours, according to statements by Karen Greenberg during her February 4, 
2009 appearance on The Daily Show.  Greenberg, author of The Least Worst Place: 
Guantanamo’s First 100 Days, revealed that the construction crews that built the center 
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were not even told until they got on the plane, that their destination was Cuba and what 
their job was.  Guantanamo was chosen because it has unique legal properties, as it is 
“leased in perpetuity to the United States by the pre-Castro Cuban government in 1903, it 
was arguably under U.S. control but not under U.S. law. This rare set of circumstances 
allowed the executive branch to hold and interrogate foreign prisoners there in any 
manner it deemed necessary, beyond meddling from Congress and courts” (Mayer, “Dark 
Side” 147).  Guantanamo was chosen specifically for these legal reasons as it was 
“…conceived by the Bush Administration as a place that could operate outside the 
system of national and international laws that normally govern the treatment of prisoners 
in U.S. custody” (Mayer, “The Experiment” 2).  Seymour Hersh explains the situation 
perfectly in that “prisoners, once captured and transported to Cuba, were in permanent 
legal limbo” (Hersh, “Chain” 2).     
 The reasoning behind why Guantanamo Bay was chosen as a detention center 
location reveals how the Bush administration was attempting to evade international laws 
and expecting injustices to occur.  The government was well aware that they would be 
breaking laws and permitting practices that were unacceptable but attempting to find 
loopholes to protect themselves.  In March 2003 it became evident that the extended 
policies would not be confined to Afghanistan as they were to be instituted in Cuba and 
additional detention locations as well.     
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Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 
 Less than two years after the invasion of Afghanistan, similar problems arose 
when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003.  The U.S. invasion of Iraq was based on similar 
goals as the invasion of Afghanistan such as obtaining information to help fight terrorism 
and to keep America protected.  With the invasion came the same three questions that 
arose at the onset of the invasion of Afghanistan, 1) What classification will these 
individuals fall under in regards to U.S. and international doctrines? 2) Where should 
these individuals be detained once captured, and 3) How will they be dealt with, in terms 
of interrogation practices, confinement, and treatment while detained by the U.S.?  It had 
already been determined with the invasion of Afghanistan that the captured individuals 
would be classified as “unlawful combatants.”  How would the policy change, if it all, for 
Iraq?  What were the answers to the two other major questions, in terms of where the 
“unlawful combatants” would be detained and how they would be treated? 
 The three questions that Iraq was now faced with were more difficult to answer as 
opposed to Afghanistan because most of the country was in support of the Afghanistan 
invasion and the need to find those who had demoralized and terrorized the U.S. on 
September 11th.  The Bush administration’s justification for invading Iraq was that there 
were verifiable links from the government in Iraq to al-Qaeda.  Further justifications were 
that Saddam Hussein was a dictator who was terrorizing his people and also that he was 
in possession of and in the process of creating chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.  
Despite countless legitimate investigative sources that reported to the White House that 
no weapons of mass destruction were found in the country, the U.S. invaded and the same 
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“war on terror” justifications and policies used in Afghanistan were to be used in Iraq.  In 
addition to the three questions that arose in both Afghanistan and Iraq, “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom” raised the question of: Once the U.S. has captured, defined, and detained 
individuals, what exactly would be interrogating about? 
 The invasion of Iraq created additional problems aside from the three major 
questions, including that of a dangerous insurgency.  With the invasion, the U.S. 
overthrew the Iraqi government, dismantled the army, and removed all high level 
positions, which were filled by Baathists, from power.  This was done because the White 
House believed that there were links inside the Iraqi government and high ranking 
Baathists to al-Qaeda.  (It has since been revealed that there were no initial links in the 
Iraqi government to al-Qaeda).  The first resistance and insurgency were the high level 
Baathists that had been removed from power, but compared to later insurgencies, this 
group was not as dangerous because the U.S. knew who they were.  Once this insurgency 
was underway, a second hit, made up of Sunni religious militants.  In early 2002 the 
Sunni’s connected with al-Qaeda, resulting in the second wave consisting of more than 
just Sunni religious militants, but al-Qaeda foreign fighters as well.  The third wave 
insurgency was comprised of Shiite militia groups.  This group was very nationalist and 
accused America early in the invasion as being “occupiers.”  The Shiites were elated 
when the U.S. announced elections because they had always been persecuted but also 
held the majority in the country, meaning they could hold power.  Additionally, the 
Shiites started to obtain weapons from likely countries such as Iran, increasing their 
power as they were no longer just a difficult enemy to detect,  but were also armed. 
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 Iraq was truly a “war zone” as these insurgencies were not only fighting the U.S. 
but each other as well.  Al-Qaeda is a religious group and made up of all Sunnis and they 
see the Shiites as ungodly and an enemy which also must be eliminated.  These 
insurgencies were increasingly dangerous as they were often disguised in everyday 
clothing and were life threatening and physical dangers as they were using IEDs 
(improvised exploding devices) and suicide bombers against U.S. forces.  Considering 
that there was so little information known about this enemy, additional questions arose, 
such as what to do with these people?  The Bush administration’s answer was that being 
the same “war on terror,” the same newly extended torture policy would be brought into 
Iraq.  Part of this policy included answering the three questions that the U.S. faced in not 
only Afghanistan but now Iraq as well. 
 The result of the Iraq invasion was that more people were being captured and in 
U.S. control.  U.S. troops at the facility described that a major problem was that “units in 
Iraq are rounding people up on hunches and suspicions…they were just arresting 
everyone” (Kennedy).  This resulted in the re-opening of a detention center in Abu 
Ghraib, Iraq which previously served as one of Saddam Hussein’s jails during his reign.  
When the U.S. took the site over, it still had “the infamous torture chambers and “stuff” 
left from Saddam’s era” (Gibney).  Other than the torture chambers and body incinerators 
left from Saddam, staff at the facility described the ever present eerie feeling on the 
grounds and in the center, due partly to the fact that there had been over “30,000 people 
executed at Abu Ghraib, most were buried there, pictures of Saddam were all over the 
prison, wild dogs were everywhere and digging up human bodies” (Kennedy).  The 
smells of sweat, trash, feces, and urine permeated the blood spattered and concrete walls, 
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walls and grounds which were daily hit with mortars and fired upon.  Additionally, the 
road outside the prison was described as the “most dangerous road on planet earth…I 
would not wish it upon my worst enemy” (Kennedy).   
 From the start of the Abu Ghraib prison re-opening, there were infrastructural 
problems.  General Tabuga issued an investigative report which exposed that “…Abu 
Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and that the MP guard force was significantly 
understaffed and short of resources…There are gross differences, Tabuga said, between 
the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially recorded” (Hersh, 
“Chain” 40).  Interviews with detention center staff in the movie Ghosts of Abu Ghraib, 
reveal that in a “high-value” section of the prison, there were only “six-seven guards 
guarding at least 1,000 detainees” (Kennedy).  Although the facility was wildly 
understaffed, individuals such as “wives, spouses, and little children” of prisoners were 
also kept at Abu Ghraib to serve as bait and an additional coercion technique used to get 
detainees to talk (Kennedy). 
 Besides being understaffed, problems also resulted from the fact that interrogators 
were not getting information that was sufficient enough for the Bush administration.  This 
resulted in Rumsfeld requesting in August of 2003 that General Miller, United States 
Army Major General, who currently commanded the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, 
be transferred to Abu Ghraib to “Gitmize Iraq.”  Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib, Miller 
believed that the reason they were not receiving actionable intelligence was because the 
MPs and MIs in Iraq were treating the prisoners too well.  Interrogation methods and 
treatment of detainees reportedly intensified under Miller’s command.  During the 
summer of 2003 the insurgency was growing fast and becoming more dangerous and a 
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major problem was that “…the American military had no idea who those people were, 
how can we (U.S.) fight an enemy we (U.S.) cannot see, the only way was to interrogate 
everyone, there was a degree of panic about the lack of knowledge about the insurgency 
(Kennedy).     
 Staff at Abu Ghraib not only had daily feelings of panic and felt the eerie history 
of the center, but soldiers reveal that they were “...told that these detainees were the worst 
of the worst, that the information would save live…that there would be global 
implications” (Kennedy).  These feelings and pressures only heightened with Miller in 
charge of interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib, meaning conditions and treatment of 
detainees became much more physical and intensified.   
 
Detention Center Personnel  
 
 Once these new interrogation methods were created by the U.S. government and 
detention center locations were chosen, the policies moved further down the chain of 
command and into the hands of interrogators, MIs, guards, soldiers, MPs, the CIA, and 
contractors.  Who were these interrogators, guards, soldiers, MIs, MPs, CIA and 
contractors?  How were they trained?  What was their background?  Discovering what 
kind of training and who these people were is important in unveiling and understanding 
some of the atrocities that occurred.  Mike Gelles, Naval Criminal Investigation Service, 
explained what he saw firsthand while working with CITF and the FBI: “For the most 
part the military interrogators seemed to be eighteen and nineteen-year-old kids passing 
through on short rotations. They’d gone through a six week training program and were 
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mechanically following the techniques allowed in the Army manual” (Sands 125).  If the 
U.S. was taking these extreme measures in order to protect American citizens and 
because they believed truly dangerous and useful detainees were in their control, why 
then were they leaving the actual interrogations to young people with little to no 
experience?  Perhaps because these interrogators were not chosen because of their 
background but because “they’re really committed to winning the mission” (Rejali 510).  
Mayer states that “most of the military interrogators in Guantanamo were young and 
inexperienced, with only six weeks of training at the Army’s Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 
interrogation course, where they were taught techniques crafted not for the war on terror, 
but for the Cold War” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 195).  Attorney William Cassara revealed 
that Damien Corsetti, Specialist in the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, was chosen 
as an interrogator “because he’s big, he’s loud, and he’s scary. That was his 
qualification” (Gibney).  In regards to his training Coresetti remarked: My interrogation 
training consisted of—basically they taught us some approaches, you know, how to get 
people to talk. And then, here, go. Go watch these guys interrogate, which were the 
people that we were replacing, for about five, six hours before I did my first 
interrogation” (Gibney).  The lack of training for Guantanamo Bay interrogators was also 
explained by in Brittain Mallow, CITF commander, who stated that “if you look at some 
of the people in charge of Guantanamo they had very little experience with intelligence, 
they had very little experience with detention operations, they had very little experience 
with interrogations and yet these were the ones making the decisions and put under the 
pressure to make those decisions without a lot of good information”  (Jones).      
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 In addition to the age and background of the interrogators, the women’s role at the 
foreign detention sites is also vital in understanding some of the indecencies that took 
place.  This is particularly sensitive to the Muslim culture in that most of the detainees 
have strict religious rules about women and their relationship with them.  Many of the 
reported abuses explained women touching detainees, revealing their skin and 
undergarments, and forcing detainees to wear underwear on their head.  The number of 
female interrogators and staff at detention centers is not well recorded information but a 
rough number from a Lieutenant for the U.S. Southern Command revealed that in 2003 
“about 20 percent of the guards at Guantanamo are women” (Dodds 1).  There was 
however, no evidence as to the number of women that worked as interrogators. 
 The U.S. government also hired private contract groups such as CACI, a company 
that specializes in IT services.  The government “hired the CACI interrogators under an 
existing contract with the company for information technology services, even though the 
military’s requirements for interrogators had tenuous links to technology” (Harris 1).  A 
considerable amount of CACI employees were directly involved in interrogations in that 
“…CACI has provided 31 interrogators since its contract with the Interior Department 
was issued August 4, 2003” (Gerin 1).  This number was obtained less than one year after 
the contract date, meaning many more CACI employees were likely hired.  An Army 
report exposed that there was no evidence of formal training for contract employees in 
that “…a third of the interrogators supplied in Iraq by CACI had not been trained in 
military interrogation methods and policies” (Chatterjee 2).   Members of CACI were 
also involved in the infamous 2004 photos from Abu Ghraib and “at least one employee 
hired under the contract, Steven Stefanowicz, is alleged in an Army report to have helped 
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set conditions at the prison that he knew would lead to physical abuse of inmates” (Harris 
1).  Private contractors involved in interrogations can be seen as problematic in many 
ways, an issue which the Pentagon itself investigated in that “…contractors are less well 
trained, less well controlled, and harder to hold accountable for things that go wrong than 
are regular troops” (Chatterjee 4).  Could this perhaps be part of the reason outside 
contractors were used?  Was the government preparing for the chance that if injustices 
occurred they wouldn’t be directly connected to the American government or military?  
 Further issues stemmed from the fact that this was a different kind of war that the 
U.S. was fighting but the interrogators and soldiers were not taught about the cultural and 
traditional norms of the Middle East.  Instead, interrogators were taught about cultural 
offenses such as sexual humiliations, which is especially degrading and dehumanizing in 
the Muslim religion.  For instance, MPs at Fort Lee “were told that sexual humiliation 
was the most effective way to ‘soften up’ Arab detainees” (Buruma 7).  The language 
barrier also posed a problem as Arabic was the primary language spoken by detainees and 
few interrogators and soldiers knew the tongue.  The CIA was at the forefront of the 
operations in most detention centers as they had “agreed to take a lead role in extracting 
intelligence from local high-value detainees” the problem being that as of January 2004 
“only four officers spoke Arabic” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 244).     
 Detention center guards and interrogators were not limited to the U.S. and hired 
contractors, as they also came from many other countries and organizations, creating 
countless additional problems.  The Center for Constitutional Rights investigated this 
issue concluding that “…the United States has allowed security officials from countries 
such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Libya, Jordan, China, and Tunisia...Bahrain, Canada, 
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France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and Yemen” to interrogate prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (“Foreign 
Interrogators” 3).  These interrogators were also involved in harsh interrogations as the 
report stated that they threatened many detainees with violence not just in the detention 
center, but also if they were ever able to return home: “Uighur prisoners in 
Guantanamo…were told by Chinese interrogators that they would be killed or imprisoned 
if the U.S. returned them to China,…Uzbek interrogators told one prisoner that ‘when he 
got back to Uzbekistan they would be waiting with one bullet for your forehead.’ In 2005 
one Libyan prisoner, Omar Khalif, was threatened by a Libyan interrogator ‘with torture, 
rape and execution upon his return to Libya’” (“Foreign Interrogators” 1-2).   
 One of the ways in which interrogators were trained to administer these new 
techniques was through a system known as SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, 
Escape).  SERE was created after the Korean War by the American and British and is a 
training technique for “specialized military programs designed to shore up the fortitude of 
soldiers going into battle” (Rejali 383).  SERE is also used to teach American soldiers 
how to resist physical and psychological torture in the event that they are captured “by 
enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions” (“Senate Armed Services 
Committee Hearing” 2).  Unlike torture methods, the SERE training program is strictly 
regimented as psychologists are present, guidelines exist for each technique, and prior to 
the program troops are “medically screened” and their “physical limitations are carefully 
documented” (“Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing” 2).   
 Ironically, the U.S. was becoming one of the very states in violation of the 
Geneva Conventions and using the program meant to resist torture, to implement it.  
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Interrogators in these detention centers were being taught the methods behind torture, and 
were supposed to use it as guidelines for interrogations.  The problem with using this 
program is that “SERE is a training regimen–it’s not designed to produce truthful 
response…without the limits set by training-where do you stop?...It just becomes 
coercion, or whatever you want to call it” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 197).  It has been reported 
that some U.S. interrogators received little, if any, training outside of the SERE program, 
leaving greater room for interpretation and atrocities because their only training was 
centered on torture.   
 Perhaps some of the greatest problems arose in that many of the interrogators 
simply lacked the necessary experience: “The officer in charge of the Joint Interrogation 
and Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib, had no interrogation experience himself and no 
skilled interrogators or interpreters working underneath him” (Budiansky 3).  Former 
defense secretary, James Schlesinger, asserted that “inadequate training and insufficient 
forces-were largely responsible for problems at the prison” (McCoy, “Question” 153).  
Rejali explains many of the flaws at detention centers in there being a “…poor selection 
of people to be interrogated and poor methods of interrogation” (Rejali 510).  The CIA 
who was meant to predominately handle “high-value” detainees also had great problems 
with interrogators in that “despite the CIA’s sweeping new authority to create 
paramilitary teams to hunt, capture, or kill suspected terrorists almost anywhere in the 
world, at the time (March 2002), the CIA had virtually no trained interrogators” (Mayer, 
“Dark Side” 144).  All of these factors concerning the actual individuals behind the 
interrogations reveal that their lack of training was a source of severe institutional 
problems.   
 38
 The lines of authority after the Bush administration and one month into the 
Obama administration, have yet to be determined.  The White House was rewriting the 
policies about interrogation techniques and the lines of authority within the military were 
constantly changing.  This often resulted in the U.S. being unsure exactly which guards, 
soldiers, MPs, MIs, interrogators, and contractors performed which actions in every case.  
It is known that the CIA had specialized rules, especially in regards to “high-value” 
detainees.  The CIA was in control of these “high-value” prisoners in special sections of 
prisons such as Abu Ghraib, or at “black sites” and rendition sites.  In these various CIA 
detention sites, it is known that some of the worst physical and psychological abuses 
were practiced.  The exact methods, however, are not known, except that waterboarding, 
a torture technique where one simultaneously feels the sensation of suffocating and 
drowning, was common practice.  From the CIA sections of detention centers, there is 
evidence that reveals some of the CIA interrogations and torture methods, such as those 
practiced on “high-value” detainee Abu Zubayda, whose specific abuses will be 
described in chapter three.  CIA interrogations occurred at black sites to allow for 
particularly intense interrogations and therefore abuses which were too great to occur on 
the grounds of known detention facilities.  There is far less information known about the 
practice of extraordinary renditions and truth extraction methods at these locations. 
 Detecting the lines of authority for U.S. soldiers, guards, MPs, MIs, and 
interrogators is much more difficult.  In many cases, the soldiers’, guards’, and MPs’ jobs 
were to “soften up” the prisoners before interrogations, punish the detainee after 
interrogations if they did not provide satisfactory answers, and abuse them throughout 
their incarceration.  Many of these abuses were for sport and meant to humiliate and 
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dehumanize the prisoners.  The MIs and interrogators’ primary responsibility was to gain 
actionable intelligence from detainees.  Often time’s abusive and psychological 
techniques were used during interrogations to get prisoners to talk.  During these 
interrogations, guards and MPs were present and if a detainee was abused during an 
interrogation, it was often difficult to determine if it was the interrogators or guards 
abusing the detainee.  Lawyer Scott Horton, remarked that the soldiers, guards, MPs, 
MIs, and interrogators “saw an intentional decision taken at the height of the Pentagon to 
put out a fog of ambiguity” (Gibney).  These individuals also have continually said that 
no one knew exactly what the rules or their roles were, except to get as much information 
possible, fast.  Although there is extensive information about particular cases and abuses 
that occurred at each site, the actual individuals who performed each, is much more 
complicated.  For this reason, when detention center personnel are unknown, it appears 
that authors or journalists will often refer to “soldiers” or “U.S. troops.”  For these 
reasons, this paper has given the names or positions of the guards, soldiers, MPs, MIs, 
and interrogators when the information is known, and terms used by the referenced 
author or speaker when the actions are more unclear.   
 
Looking Ahead 
 
 The justification for the administering of torture was to protect America because 
“necessity justifies all. Anything goes in the quest for national security” (Sands 26).  
Furthering this point John Arquilla, a professor of Defense Analysis at the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School, remarked that “this is a war in which intelligence is everything” 
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(Hersh, “Chain” 2).  Intelligence in most any situation especially that of war, is a crucial 
aspect and can save lives.  The manner in which we obtain this information must be taken 
with extreme caution however.  Despite laws and research declaring that torture is illegal 
and ineffective, figures in the Bush administration still felt that the way in which to attain 
national security was through “harsh interrogation” methods.  
 As was explained in chapter one, U.S. domestic and international policy has been 
changing drastically since September 11, 2001.  This can lead to an unclear interpretation 
of what is acceptable and how to implement these new methods because no one knew 
which policies and standards to follow, both of which were “open to broad interpretation” 
(Chatterjee 1).  In addition to this, there was also poor training, quality, and experience of 
detention center employees that culminated in a lack of orders, blurring of orders, and 
interrogators acting on their own accord.  For these reasons a crucial question that arises 
is: Although the administration had broken numerous domestic and international 
agreements, how were these policies implemented and what atrocities resulted at 
American run detention centers? 
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Chapter 3 
 
“The Worst of the Worst” 
 “Interrogation Log of Detainee 063 
Day 22, December 14, 2002 
 
0001: Detainee’s hands were cuffed at his sides to prevent him from conducting his 
prayer ritual… 
 
0025: Lead taped picture of 3 year old victim over detainee’s heart…Control drips a few 
drops of water on detainee’s head to keep him awake. Detainee struggles when the water 
is dripped on his head… 
 
0120: Interrogators take a break and detainee listens to white noise. Detainee goes to 
bathroom and is exercised while hooded… 
 
1630: Corpsman checks vitals-gives three bags of IV…Detainee broke down crying…” 
(Sands 71).   
 
 
 The rules of interrogation were drastically changing as national and international 
agreements were violated in order for the United States to extend interrogation policies.  
The new policy answered the three crucial questions that the country was faced with by: 
classifying the people that were captured, deciding where to detain them, and finally how 
to treat and interrogate them.  Once the detainees, detention facilities, guards, soldiers, 
contractors, the CIA, MPs, MIs, and interrogators were all in place, what was next?  The 
U.S. did not know who exactly each individual was, their affiliation with al-Qaeda, 
relationship to Osama bin Laden, if they were a terrorist, or in many cases, what their 
name was.  It was primarily the interrogators’ responsibility to extract all of this 
information as well as any and all information the prisoners had.  It was primarily the 
soldiers’ and guards’ role to “soften up” prisoners for interrogations and punish them 
after if they did not give suitable responses.  The question then arises as to how exactly 
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the extended interrogation techniques went beyond White House memorandums and to 
their actual execution at detention centers? 
 Problems with the proper way an individual should be interrogated began with 
those who initially captured and transferred detainees to detention sites.  The crucial time 
to interrogate someone is immediately after capture.  This is when individuals are most 
vulnerable and the chance of a true confession is most likely (Sands 148).  This window 
of opportunity was not taken advantage of and crucial information was lost, setting the 
U.S. behind even before interrogations began. 
 Soldiers, guards, military intelligence and police, contractors, the CIA, and 
interrogators at detention sites, were constantly reminded of the importance of their roles 
and all felt the pressures from this, pressure that originated from the Bush administration.  
Corsetti revealed that they were often told: “Soldiers are dying. Get the information.” 
That’s all you’re told. “Get the information” (Gibney).  Some of the orders to soldiers 
and guards were to “soften up” prisoners before interrogations, to ensure that particular 
prisoners had a “bad night,” and that they should use their imagination in interpreting the 
orders (Kennedy).  “Softening up” prisoners often meant physically, sexually, religiously, 
or psychologically harming or humiliating prisoners in order to provoke them to confess 
during interrogations.  After interrogations, if the prisoners did not give sufficient 
information or answers, the soldiers, guards, and MPs would then punish them in ways 
similar to those mentioned above, if not worse, in order for the detainees to understand 
that the abuses would not stop and perhaps worsen until information was divulged.    
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Physical abuses 
 
 The highest numbers of abuses were physical as testimonies, medical records, 
books, detainee logs, and investigations all revealed.  A Red Cross report, Report on the 
Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and other protected persons in 
Iraq, listed that some of the main violations were: “Brutality against protected persons 
upon capture and initial custody, sometimes causing death or serious injury” and 
“excessive and disproportionate use of force against persons deprived of their liberty 
resulting in death or injury during their period of internment” (Danner 252).  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross gave an overview of physical abuses detailing 
that there was no primary way in which a detainee was physically assaulted, as abuses 
ranged from hitting, slapping, punching, kicking, kneeing, etc. with their own bodies or 
weapons such as bats, batons, metal poles, rifles… (Danner 6).  The FBI also disclosed a 
report on the range of atrocities performed on prisoners including: “Strangulation, 
beatings, placement of lit cigarettes into the detainees’ ear openings and unauthorized 
interrogation” (McCoy, “Question” 158).  
 Perhaps some of the greatest and most obscene abuses were explained in Major 
General Antonio M. Taguba’s report of abuses at Abu Ghraib carried out by soldiers of 
the “372nd Military Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence 
community” (“Hersh, “Torture” 1-2).  The abuses included: “Breaking chemical lights 
and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; 
beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; 
allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after 
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being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light 
and perhaps a broomstick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate 
detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee” (Hersh, 
“Chain” 22).  Reports reveal that interrogators and guards often “stripped detainees 
naked, put them in stress positions, used dogs to scare them, put leashes around their 
necks to humiliate them, hooded them, deprived them of sleep, and blasted music at 
them” (“Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing” 1).  The different ways in which to 
harm a detainee were often used in un-patterned and a variety of ways to further disorient 
and torment him.   
 Evidence of abuse was also obtained firsthand through detainee and interrogator 
testimonies and interviews. An Iraqi detainee confessed: “Americans in civilian clothing 
beat him repeatedly, dislocated his shoulder, stepped on his nose until it broke, choked 
him with a rope and hit him in the leg with a bat” (N. Lewis and Jehl 1).  In August of 
2004, an interrogator’s testimony from Guantanamo Bay stated that: “On a couple of 
occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a detainee chained hand and foot in a fetal 
position on the floor, with no chair, food or water…they had urinated or defecated on 
themselves, and had been left there for 18 to 24 hours or more…visited an ‘almost 
unconscious’ prisoner in a room where the temperature was ‘probably well above 100 
degrees and a pile of hair next to him” (Mayer, “The Experiment” 9).  A report in the 
McClatchy Newspaper revealed further physical abuses in that, “the guards kicked, 
kneed, and punched many of the men until they collapsed in pain. US troops shackled 
and dragged other detainees to small isolation rooms, then hung them by their wrists from 
chains dangling from the wire mesh ceiling” (Lasseter, “Day 2” 1).  Detainee testimonies 
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further exposed that their treatment entailed “…not just standing, but being kept up on 
their tiptoes with their arms extended out and up over their heads, attached by shackles on 
their wrists and ankles…during the entire period, they said they were kept stark naked 
and often cold. This process was repeated every day for two or three hours in most cases” 
(Mayer, “Dark Side” 168).  U.S. troops at Abu Ghraib allegedly “witnessed detainees 
being stripped, beaten, covered in mud, drenched in freezing water, and made to stand all 
night in front of air conditioners. One was made to drink urine” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 
250).       
 The McClatchy report exposed that “guards said they routinely beat their 
prisoners to retaliate for al Qaida's 9-11 attacks” (Lasseter, “Day 2” 2).  Recall from 
chapter one the severity and shock of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on 
America.  Interrogators were under great pressure that the information they were 
responsible for obtaining, could assist in preventing another attack from occurring.  More 
so, they were told that the individuals in their control were suspected members al-Qaeda 
and other terrorist networks.  This invigorated and angered many of the soldiers and 
interrogators at the facilities and the aggression was taken out on the detainees.  Brian 
Cammack, a former specialist with the 377th Military Police Company, told how these 
abuses were not only common but frequent: “Whether they got in trouble or not, 
everybody struck a detainee at some point” (Lasseter “Day 2” 5).  The cruel treatment of 
detainees was therefore not always to “soften them up” but out of revenge and anger.  
Abuses were not uncommon because before long soldiers, contractors, guards, MIs, MPs, 
and the CIA at the detention centers felt they had legitimate reasons for abusing detainees 
and that it was common practice.  Determining if their actions were retribution for 
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September 11th or for truth extraction purposes was very difficult, partly because they 
were so frequent. 
 The brutalities were not restricted to one interrogation facility, as each center 
would institute their own guidelines and rules in addition to the ones established by the 
Bush administration.  Intelligence units at Guantanamo Bay, under the control of General 
Miller, adopted a “72-point matrix for stress and duress,” which was a combination of 
physical, psychological, and sexual abuses which entailed: “Harsh heat or cold; 
withholding food; hooding for days at a time; naked isolation in cold, dark cells for more 
than 30 days; and… ‘stress positions’ designed to subject detainees to rising levels of 
pain” (McCoy, “Question” 129).  The combination of a variety of abuses used on 
detainees by American, hired, contracted, and foreign soldiers, guards, interrogators, 
MPs, and MIs, has been witnessed in every detention center.  These techniques were 
easily spread to different detention centers because high ranking officials such as Carolyn 
Wood, United States Army Captain, and General Miller, two high ranking officers known 
for their harsh tactics, were used at multiple facilities.  Treatment and interrogation 
practices were also not well controlled as in Abu Ghraib, for instance, some MPs were 
often in competition and would have “…contests to see how quickly a prisoner could be 
brought to tears” (Rejali 509).   
 In one known instance, detainees banned together and rioted because of the 
continual harsh treatment.  In the fall of 2003 at Abu Ghraib, the detainee riot was an act 
that “set everyone off,” according to soldiers and guards at the facility (Kennedy).  In 
response, the soldiers gathered the rioters together, stripped them naked, and threw them 
on the cold concrete floor where the soldiers then “took their aggression out on them” 
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(Kennedy).  During this time, three prisoners were also accused of raping another 
prisoner at Abu Ghraib.  This resulted in staff handcuffing, stripping the detainees naked, 
throwing them on the concrete floor, dragging them across the length of the floor, and 
then positioning them atop each other and in positions that appeared as if they were 
having sex.   
 
“Low-Value” Detainees 
 
 Nazar Chaman Gul was wrongly imprisoned at Bagram for four months because 
U.S. troops received a tip from a “tribal rival who was seeking revenge against another 
man” and the troops wrongly took Gul as they confused him with a “militant with a 
similar name” (Lasseter, “Day 2” 2).  Although considered a “low-value” detainee, Gul 
testified that he was beaten about every five days.  Gul additionally remarked that he was 
commonly abused by soldiers that would “ram their combat boots into his back and 
stomach,” his hands would then be tied behind his back and the beatings would continue 
(Lasseter, “Day 2” 1). 
 Bashir Ahmad was captured in November of 2001 by warlord General Dostum’s 
men where he and about 300 other men were crammed “in a metal shipping container” 
(Galloway 2).  Dostum’s men then held Ahmad for over a year at a jail in Afghanistan 
before he was sent to Bagram and finally Guantanamo Bay.  In regards to his treatment at 
Bagram, Ahmad claimed that: “Sometimes three guards would come take me to a 
separate room and tie my hands to a chain that was hanging from the ceiling. They would 
pull the chain tightly so that I rose up in the air. Sometimes they did it the other way, 
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pulling me up by my feet. And then they would punch me or hit me with a wood rod they 
used to carry” (Galloway 2).  Once transferred to Guantanamo, Ahmad made an 
unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide by using his bed sheet to make a noose.  He 
remarked that while at Guantanamo: “Five soldiers would come with bulletproof jackets 
and weapons to my cell, to my cage. One of them would spray me in the face. My eyes 
would burn and water” (Galloway 2).  From the onset of his imprisonment, Ahmad was 
treated cruelly, despite his classification as a “low-level” detainee.  In September 2004, 
Ahmad was released from Guantanamo.       
 Mohammed Akhtiar was also wrongly imprisoned at Bagram because his capture 
originated from “bad information by another Afghan who’d harbored a personal 
vendetta” against him (Lasseter, “Day1” 3).  When Akhtiar asked what his crime was, 
soldiers responded by throwing him down the stairs (Lasseter, “Day 1” 5).  Abdulraham 
Ahmed Al Deemawi experienced more than just physical harm, but also abuses meant to 
be psychological and sexual harms.  Deemawi recalls being threatened with dogs, 
stripped and photographed “in shameful and obscene positions” and placed in a cage with 
a hook and a hanging rope.  He stated that he was hung from a hook and blindfolded, 
with the longest duration being two days (“Bagram Prison” 1).  Both Akhtiar and 
Deemawi were considered “low-value” detainees. 
 
“High-Value” Detainees     
 
 Abu Zubayda was “America’s first ‘high-value detainee’” and was suspected to 
be the “Al Qaeda logistics chief” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 139).  On March 28, 2002, after 
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being shot in the “thigh, stomach, and groin,” by “CIA, FBI, and Pakistani law-
enforcement and intelligence officials” Zubayda was captured outside a hospital in 
Faisalabad, Pakistan (Mayer, “Dark Side” 139-141).  Zubayda’s capture was the product 
of information from a taxi driver and a $10 million payoff to the Pakistani ISI (Mayer, 
“Dark Side” 141).  Zubayda had suffered such severe injuries that a doctor said “he’d 
never seen anyone with such egregious injuries survive” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 141).  
Zubayda’s physical condition caused him to need the assistance of many drugs and it was 
reported that extracting information from him was difficult because he had been “sedated 
with painkillers.”  When Bush heard of this difficulty he replied, “Who authorized 
putting him on pain medication?” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 143), revealing how a prisoner’s 
physical well-being was not a prime concern.  Once Zubayda was stabilized, he was 
flown by numerous pilots to a “black site” location in Thailand (Mayer, “Dark Side” 
149).   
 Zubayda’s treatment and interrogations were tailored according to his “high 
value” detainee status.  In testimonies he revealed that the torture he received, which was 
referred to as “hard time,” did not begin until “some weeks after he was captured” 
(Mayer, “Dark Side” 164).  Recall from chapter two that the most effective time to 
interrogate an individual was right after capture.  Some of the abuses inflicted upon him 
consisted of being locked into a “tiny coffin” for hours on end, which he described as 
“excruciatingly painful” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 165).  Zubayda also told the ICRC that 
waterboarding was practiced on him frequently by the CIA, “…at least ten times in a 
single week, often twice a day” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 173).  Physical punishment during 
interrogations was also inflicted on Zubayda as he described being “…thrust headfirst 
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against a bare concrete wall (Mayer, “Dark Side” 169).  The Bush administration later 
revealed that Zubayda divulged useful information for use in the “war on terror.”  These 
instances are explained and refuted in chapter four.  
  Perhaps one of the most publicized and known prisoners is Mohammed al-
Qahtani, also known as detainee 063.  Captured in Afghanistan in December 2001, 
Qahtani “remained anonymous for seven months” until the FBI, during a routine 
fingerprint test, discovered that Qahtani’s prints appeared to match those of the suspected 
twentieth hijacker of September 11th that didn’t get past airport security (Mayer, “Dark 
Side” 191).    Immediately, Qahtani’s classification went from unidentifiable to that of 
“high-value” in that he was believed to be very dangerous and have extensive 
information that could be useful to the U.S. and the “war on terror.”  For this reason, his 
treatment and interrogations were tailored accordingly and therefore were much harsher.   
 Held captive at Guantanamo Bay, Qahtani was physically, psychologically, 
sexually, and religiously abused and humiliated.  Some of his abuses included being 
“deprived of adequate sleep for weeks on end, stripped naked, subjected to loud music, a 
dog was used to scare him, and a leash was placed around his neck as he was forced to 
perform dog tricks” (“Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing” 7). Qahtani was 
forced to endure further physical, psychological, and sexual atrocities at the hands of U.S. 
soldiers such as being “…forced to strip naked, wear a leash, and perform dog tricks. He 
was forced to wear a bra, and thong underwear on his head. He was deprived of the 
opportunity to use a toilet after having been force fed liquids intravenously.  By the 
fourth day of his confinement, Qahtani had become so dehydrated that the Navy 
corpsmen administering an IV was unable to locate a vein in his arm, causing a doctor to 
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be called to implant a shunt in his hand” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 207).  Qahtani endured 
these range of abuses, treatments, and dehumanizing tactics for both “softening up” and 
interrogation purposes, both of which were meant to force a confession from him.  As 
studies and investigations reveal, however, if Qahtani was in fact the twentieth hijacker 
and had valuable information, the methods in which he was interrogated have proven to 
be unsuccessful, elicit false confessions, and make the prisoner even less inclined to 
cooperate.   
 Top government officials such as Rumsfeld were directly connected to Qahtani’s 
treatment and interrogations.  White House officials were growing nervous about the lack 
of valuable intelligence from detainees’ and were therefore exceptionally eager in “high-
value” cases such as Qahtani’s.  Although figures in the Bush administration were not 
physically present during interrogations, the authorization came from the top, making 
them responsible and liable for the ensuing atrocities.  David Becker, who was the 
“overseer of much of Qahtani’s treatment” and “chief of the ‘Interrogation Control 
Element in Guantanamo until December 2002,’” revealed that “the problem began at the 
top… Many of the aggressive interrogation techniques …were a direct result of the 
pressure we (U.S. interrogators) felt from Washington to obtain intelligence and the lack 
of policy guidance being issued from Washington” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 195).   
 
Detainee Deaths 
 
 In some cases physical pain and the intensity of interrogations sometimes went 
too far, resulting in the death of detainees.  As early as 2002, detainees were dying at the 
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hands of interrogators and soldiers in Bagram, where in the span of ten days, two 
individuals were killed.  “Low-value” Bagram prisoners, Habibullah and Dilawar, both 
died from “blunt force injuries” (Jaffer and Singh 48).  The 2007 movie, Taxi to the Dark 
Side, was centered on Dilawar, an Afghan taxi driver who was killed in Bagram although 
“interrogators themselves believed him to be innocent” (Jaffer and Singh 148).  The 
information detailing Dilawar’s confinement and interrogations reveal that most of the 
abuses he received were physical.  Dilawar “…had been beaten and chained by his wrists 
for four days. After his last torture session, Dilawar was chained back to the ceiling” 
(“Bagram Prison” 1).  The night Dilawar died, soldiers hit him with a “common peroneal 
strike-a blow to the soft tissue and sensitive nerves just above the knee-a coroner later 
testified that the tissue in his legs had ‘basically been pulpified’” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 
225).  It was reported that Dilawar was praying and crying for his parents and the MPs 
beat and kicked him to quiet him: “There were four MPs on this guy, one kept giving him 
kidney shots, two were holding him down, and the fourth jumped on his back” (Gibney).  
Spc. Willie Brand admitted to his involvement and cruel physical treatment towards 
Dilawar revealing that he “hit Dilawar about 37 times, including some 30 times in the 
flesh around the knees during one session in an isolation cell” (Lasseter “Day 2” 4), with 
Brand’s reasoning being that he was “fed up with him” (Rashid 303).  Brandt also 
testified that he “struck him (Dilawar) so many times in the leg, that his own leg got tired 
and he had to switch to the other” (Gibney).   
 Both of these prisoners were believed to be very “low-value” and abused for sport 
and because they initially would not answer questions.  The soldiers went beyond 
following orders and abused detainees to the point of death.  In both of these deaths, the 
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only punishments given were to Army Captain Christopher Beiring, which consisted of a 
“letter of reprimand” and to Willie Brand, who also received a minimal charge in that he 
had “faced up to 11 years in prison, (but) was reduced in rank to private” (Lasseter, “Day 
2” 4). 
 The reported deaths continued with the November 4, 2003 death of Manadel al-
Jamadi and the November 26 death of Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush at the 
Abu Ghraib detention facility.  The CIA believed al-Jamadi to be a “high-value” detainee 
as he was allegedly a “former officer in Saddam Hussein's army and a key leader of a 
terrorist cell” and “a suspect in an attack on the al-Rashid Hotel during a visit by Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in October 2003” (McChesney 1).  Al-Jamadi was 
captured by the CIA and Navy SEALs at his home outside of Baghdad where he was then 
interrogated at Army and SEAL field bases by the CIA where “the SEALs punched, 
kicked, and struck him with their riffle muzzles for some twenty minutes” (Mayer, “Dark 
Side” 249).  Next,  al-Jamadi was “stripped, seated, and drenched in cold water” and was 
“moaning, “I’m dying, I’m dying” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 250) before his final location, 
Abu Ghraib.  Al-Jamadi died at Abu Ghraib and a photo of his lifeless body with 
American soldiers giving the “thumbs up” sign over it, was one of those exposed on April 
28, 2004 (Mayer, “Dark Side” 259).   
 Mowhoush’s death according to the U.S. military, was due to “natural causes” but 
an Army autopsy report proved otherwise, revealing that he “died from suffocation and 
“blunt force trauma” (McCoy, “Question” 144).  Army investigator Curtis Ryan reported 
that soldiers would “slap Mowhoush, and then after a few slaps, it turned into punches” 
(McCoy, “Question” 145).  Ryan also claimed that although Mowhoush’s body was 
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sealed in a bag, an act which suffocated and killed him, that all of the procedures were 
“approved and effective” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 145).  The physical abuse inflicted on 
Mowhoush took place in “sessions.”  One of these sessions entailed having his “…hands 
bound, being struck repeatedly on the back of his arms…and being doused in water” 
(“Command’s Responsibility” 3).     
 The main person involved in Mowhoush’s death was interrogator and Chief 
Warrant Officer, Lewis Welshofer, who “…took Mowhoush, his hands bound, before an 
audience of fellow detainees and slapped him-an attempt, according to Welshofer, to 
show Mowhoush who was in charge” (“Command’s Responsibility” 2).  Testimonies 
from three U.S. soldiers revealed that the “CIA and possibly Army Special Forces 
personnel” proceeded to “beat Mowhoush with sledgehammer handles…eight to ten of 
the non-military forces interrogate[d] Mowhoush and ‘beat the crap’ out of him” 
(“Command’s Responsibility” 2).  This resulted in “massive bruising and five broken 
ribs” (“Command’s Responsibility” 2).  Trial testimony revealed that on November 26, 
Mowhoush was “…shoved head-first into the sleeping bag, wrapped in electrical cord, 
and rolled from his stomach to his back. Welshofer sat on Mowhoush’s chest and blocked 
his nose and mouth” (“Command’s Responsibility” 2).   According to an autopsy report, 
Mowhoush died from “asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression” (Command’s 
Responsibility” 3).  Before he was killed, Mowhoush received more than just physical 
abuse but psychological and emotional as well when U.S. soldiers “…made Mowhoush 
believe his son would be executed if he did not speak to their satisfaction, and soldiers 
fired a bullet in the ground near Mohammed’s head (his son) within earshot but just 
beyond the eyesight of Mowhoush” (Command’s Responsibility” 3).  Welshofer’s only 
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charge was “a written reprimand, a $6,000 fine, and 60 days with movement restricted to 
his home, base, and church” (Command’s Responsibility” 3).  Welshofer’s justification 
for his actions was that as part of the military intelligence, “there were no specific rules 
of engagement for interrogations in Iraq” (Command’s Responsibility” 1).    
 The direct result of these physical abuses was individuals with permanent 
physical damage and in some cases, individuals that were killed.  Detainee deaths are 
difficult to discover as often times medical records and evidence of these instances were 
often well hidden or destroyed.  Human Rights First in 2005 exposed that in Afghanistan 
“nine detainees are now known to have died in US custody…including four cases already 
determined by Army investigators to be murder or manslaughter,” and in Iraq US intense 
interrogations have resulted in “…55 substantiated cases of detainee abuse in Iraq, plus 
twenty instances of detainee deaths still under investigation” (“II. A World of Abuse” 1-
2).  As of 2004 the death toll had risen according to the Defense Departments 
‘Information Paper’ numbers.  In April of 2004 it listed “62 allegations of prisoner abuse, 
including 14 prisoner deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan which could not be attributed to 
natural causes” (Jaffer and Singh 52).   
 In many of these cases, it is clear that guards, soldiers, contractors, the CIA, and 
MPs, went beyond orders and greatly harmed detainees.  Torturing individuals for no 
reason and going beyond protocol is much different and more serious than humiliations 
and lesser degrees of abuse such as hooding or confinement.  These different levels of 
activity require different levels of responsibility to be assigned to guards, soldiers, 
contractors, the CIA, MIs, and MPs.  This is an issue with many stipulations as it is 
difficult to determine who was in fact a high-value detainee, when accidental deaths 
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occurred, when soldiers and guards were following orders, and when their intention was 
to inflict severe pain.  Distinguishing between individual levels of responsibility and 
involvement through the chain of command, from George Bush to low level guards, is 
proving to be a complicated and problematic issue that the Obama administration is 
currently faced with.   
 Many of these practices were not listed in the Bush administration’s extended 
interrogation policies, an issue that concerned individuals who witnessed the abuses.  One 
such individual was Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick II, who is now facing “prosecution in 
Iraq, on charges that include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners, 
maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts” (Hersh, “Torture” 1).  Frederick stated: “I 
questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates in their cell 
with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell—and 
the answer I got was, ‘This is how military intelligence (MI) wants it done.’ . . . . MI has 
also instructed us to place a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet 
or running water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days” (Hersh, “Torture” 
3).  Facing similar charges is Sergeant Javal Davis, who also questioned interrogation 
practices and the treatment of detainees.  In a statement to C.I.D. (Criminal Investigation 
Division) investigator Davis stated: “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . . 
being made to do various things that I would question morally. . . . We were told that they 
had different rules” (Hersh, “Torture” 3).  When Davis was “asked what MI said he 
stated: ‘Loosen this guy up for us.’ ‘Make sure he has a bad night.’ ‘Make sure he gets 
the treatment.’ ” (Hersh, “Torture” 3).   
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Sexual and Religious Abuses 
 
 Physical harm appears to be the most common abuse but abuses such as sexual, 
religious, and psychological, ones that do not leave physical marks, can be just, if not 
more, damaging to an individual.  Sexual abuses, which were often coupled with other 
cruelties, are often considered psychological and religious abuse because of their nature 
and who they are inflicted upon.  Muslim religion and culture, which nearly all of the 
detainees were affiliated with, have strict rules about the relationship between men and 
women.  The presence and behavior of women can be seen as degrading, and for this 
reason, women were used as guards and interrogators at detention centers.  Females 
would touch detainees, wear provocative clothing, wipe what would appear to be 
menstrual blood on the prisoners, put female undergarments on detainees, and force them 
to strip naked.  Female interrogators would use these tactics to “break Muslim detainees,” 
achieved through “…sexual touching, wearing a miniskirt and thong underwear and in 
one case smearing a Saudi man’s face with fake menstrual blood” (Dodds 1).  A specific 
case of such sexual abuses occurred in April of 2003 at Guantanamo Bay when “a female 
interrogator took off her uniform top, ran her fingers through a detainees hair and sat on 
his lap” (Dodds 1).  Many of these acts would be considered humiliating and degrading to 
not just Muslims but individuals of most backgrounds and affiliations as well.  
 As of 2005, at least eight detainees have told their attorneys that females at the 
interrogation centers “rubbed their bodies against the men, wore skimpy clothes in front 
of them, made sexually explicit remarks and touched them provocatively” (Leonnig 1).  
Many of these violations have also been confirmed by an investigation by the Pentagon.  
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This investigation exposed the instance of a “female interrogator, attempting to unsettle a 
Muslim detainee, smeared fake menstrual blood on him. And in five separate occasions 
Korans were defiled; one solider urinated through a ventilation shaft, splashing the text” 
(Mayer, “The Experiment” 2).  The photos revealed in 2004 from Abu Ghraib were also 
of detainees that were forced into sexually compromising positions with other detainees.  
These included detainees stripped of their clothing, and forced into humiliating positions 
which appear as if they are performing oral sex on other detainees.  Pictures and reports 
also expose groups of naked detainees that are piled on top of each other (“Abuse of 
Iraqi” 1).  Qahtani was also violated with sexual abuses as he was “…ordered to dance 
with a male interrogator, straddled by a female interrogator in a gambit called ‘invasion 
of space by female,’ forced to undergo an enema, and strip-searched in front of females. 
He was also shown provocative photos of scantily clad women, some of which were hung 
around his neck” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 207).     
 Middle Eastern cultures and religions also have strict standards about homosexual 
relationships and activities.  It is exceptionally embarrassing for these individuals to be 
naked while in the presence of other men.  This was taken advantage of by interrogators 
and staff at detention centers, as Abu Ghraib Specialist Matthew Wisdom reveals that he 
saw “…two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open” 
(Hersh, “Chain” 24).  In photos received from Iraq, male detainees are seen “positioned 
to simulate sex with each other. And in most of the pictures, the Americans are laughing, 
posing, pointing or giving the camera the thumbs-up” (Lueng 1).  In some instances there 
are photographs and reports where sexual abuses went beyond simulated masturbation 
and sex, to that of forced masturbation by male detainees.  Sergeant Selena Salcedo, a 
 59
female U.S. military intelligence officer, reported that she witnessed interrogator, Pfc. 
Damien Corsetti, pull “down the pants of a detainee and leave his genitals exposed…the 
detainee was bent over a table and Corsetti was waving a plastic bottle near his buttocks. 
She said she didn’t know whether the detainee had been raped” (Lasseter “Day 2” 5).  
Bagram prisoner, Hussain Adbulkad Mustafa, contended that he too was sodomized by 
US soldiers (Jeralyn 2).  In February of 2005, it was reported that “…Mustafa, was 
blindfolded, handcuffed, gagged, and forced to bend down over a table by three 
American soldiers. He said: ‘They forcibly rammed a stick up my rectum…I could not 
stop screaming when this happened’” (“Bagram Prison” 1).  Investigations released by 
the ACLU and from US Army investigations reveal that “…prisoners were subjected to 
mock executions, sexually humiliated and, in some cases, raped” (Jeralyn 1).  In the cases 
where detainees were sodomized there is not only sexual and religious harm done, but 
injury to internal organs as well.  Furthermore, a great problem with these acts is the 
effects from such treatment go beyond those felt by the individual prisoners and to the 
Arab world and rest of the globe as well: “We (U.S.) went to Iraq to democratize the 
Middle East. The last thing you want to do is let the Arab world know how you treat 
Arab males in prison” (Hersh, “Chain” 65).   
 
Sleep Deprivation  
 
 Sleep deprivation was also practiced on detainees meant to disorient, frustrate, 
and weaken them.  Detainees who experience extended sleep deprivation begin to have 
their body functions shut down, cannot think clearly, and it is difficult for them to 
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function.  Sleep deprivation was a common disorienting tactic that spread to all detention 
facilities, with the standards and regulations varying at each.  Danner writes how “sleep 
adjustment was brought with the 519th (Military Intelligence Battalion) from 
Afghanistan. It is also a method used at GITMO….At Abu Ghraib, however, the MPs 
were not trained, nor informed as to how they actually should do the sleep adjustment. 
The MPs were just told to keep a detainee awake for a time specified by the interrogator. 
The MPs used their own judgment as to how to keep them awake. Those techniques 
included taking the detainees out of their cells, stripping them and giving them cold 
showers. CPT Wood stated she did not know this was going on and thought the detainees 
were being kept awake by the MPs banging on the cell doors, yelling, and playing loud 
music” (Danner 39).   
 Sleep deprivation was frequently practiced on Qahtani, one such recorded 
instance being on November 23, 2002 when he was “…brought in shackles to a plywood 
interrogation booth, where his hood was removed and he was bolted to the floor. For 
forty-eight of the next fifty-four consecutive days, he was allowed only four hours of 
sleep a night” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 206).  By the second day of this sleep regimen, 
Qahtani was struggling without sleep and was told by interrogators that “sleeping and not 
paying attention will not be tolerated” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 206).  Qahtani underwent this 
unique interrogation routine because it was specifically authorized from one of the key 
figures in the Bush administration, Donald Rumsfeld.  On November 12, 2002 Rumsfeld 
verbally authorized a “special interrogation plan” that permitted interrogators to confine 
al-Qahtani in an “isolation facility” for up to thirty days, subject him to “20 hour 
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interrogations for every 24-hour cycle” and intimidate him with dogs” (Jaffer and Singh 
46).     
 Sleep deprivation was also indirectly caused by practices such as light 
manipulation, loud music/white noise, and temperature manipulation.  Many of the 
prisoners revealed being isolated for days in cells that were “always flooded with light” 
(McCoy, “Question” 158).  Certain methods which are referred to as “breaking tactics,” 
involve blasting loud, repetitive, and often offensive music, such as Bruce Springsteen's 
“Born in the USA” or the intermingled sounds of crying babies and a “television 
commercial for meow mix cat food” (Smith 2).  Such an instance was seen in Bagram 
where “low-value” detainee Nusrat Khan, seventy plus years old, described U.S. soldiers 
as having “…blindfolded him, put earphones on his head and tied his hands behind his 
back for almost four weeks straight” (Lasseter “Day 1” 4).     
 
The “Frequent Flyer” Program 
 
 Disorienting, frightening, and not disclosing information about their detainment to 
prisoners was also a common practice by U.S. troops at detention sites.  This was 
achieved through many methods, one particular one was known as the “frequent flyer” 
program.  This program entailed blindfolding, binding, and frequently transferring a 
detainee to different cells and detention sites.  One particular case of this practice was at 
Guantanamo Bay, on teenager “Mohammed Jawad, an Afghan accused of throwing a 
grenade at a convoy of American soldiers in Kabul in late 2002, wounding two” (A. 
Lewis 1).  Jawad’s program entailed “every three hours, day and night, he (prisoner) was 
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shackled and moved to another cell—112 times over fourteen days” (A. Lewis 1).  
Similar to how many of the interrogation tactics such as waterboarding and sexual 
humiliations were done for sport, so was the “frequent flyer” program.  In regards to the 
reasoning behind Jawad’s subjection to the program: “Officers at Guantánamo said they 
did not believe he had any valuable intelligence information, and he was not even 
questioned during the ‘frequent flyer program. The most likely scenario…is that they 
simply decided to torture Mr. Jawad for sport, to teach him a lesson, perhaps to make an 
example of him to others” (A. Lewis 1).     
 
Psychological Abuses 
 
 Whether intended or not, psychological effects were often the byproduct of 
everyday interrogation methods such as physical abuse, physical restraint, stress 
positions, hooding, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, light manipulation, loud 
music/ white noise, sexual abuses, religious violations, the use of dogs, temperature 
manipulation, and humiliations.  An ICRC report explained that in military intelligence 
sections of Abu Ghraib, “…methods of physical and psychological coercion used by the 
interrogators appeared to be part of the standard operating procedures by military 
intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and extract information” (“II. A World of 
Abuse” 2).  A collection of Harvard psychiatrists discussed the side effects of America’s 
cruel treatment towards detainees and that the method of sensory deprivation, could 
“…produce major mental and behavioral changes in man” (McCoy, “Question” 40).  
Results of such actions were that prisoners were reportedly found banging their heads 
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against their concrete cell walls, screaming in the nights, crying, holding their bodies and 
rocking back and forth, after interrogation sessions (Gibney).   
 As the PBS documentary Torturing Democracy explains, in nearly every case, 
these techniques were not performed just one time, but continually, in different forms and 
manners, differing durations, varying degrees, and during the entirety of the detainee’s 
confinement.  Alone, many of these tactics such as sleep deprivation, loud music, 
confinement, and light manipulation, are not difficult to tolerate, but once practiced 
repeatedly and combined with a variety of other interrogation practices, it becomes 
detrimental to the detainee and is torture.   
 Detainees have more than just emotional and psychological damage but have the 
physical scars to prove it.  In some instances the interrogations went too far and 
individuals were killed.  What was achieved through these malicious acts?  Was any 
useful information gained?  In the year 2009 with the recent shutting down of 
Guantanamo Bay by President Barack Obama, America’s actions in overseas detention 
centers have not gone unnoticed.  After over seven years of cruelty and inhumane acts, 
what are the negative effects of America’s actions?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64
Chapter 4  
 
Does the End Justify the Means? 
“As of September 2006 the number of detainees reached 86,000. None of them were 
convicted” - Taxi to the Dark Side 
 
“Whoever authorized torture in Iraq and elsewhere undermined the prospect of good 
human intelligence. Even if the torture produced more names (“actionable intelligence”), 
it also polarized the population, eliminating the middle that might cooperate. As we 
divided the world into “friends” and “enemies,” we also alienated those who wished to 
be neither but hated our enemies just as much as we did” – Darius Rejali 
 
 
 The United States torture policy after September 11, 2001 went from secret 
meeting rooms in the White House to interrogation rooms and cell blocks at U.S. run 
detention centers.  This policy has domestic and international legal implications as well 
as physical and psychological effects, all of which tarnish the U.S. reputation, could have 
negative repercussions for future prisoners of war, adversely affect the county’s 
international standing and legitimacy, and create a possible growth of anti-American 
extremists.  What were the justifications given by the Bush administration for rewriting 
the existing laws and agreements that authorized torture, considering that they were 
breaking these laws and could be faced with lasting negative consequences?  Did the 
administration reach their goal of obtaining useful information meant to better protect the 
U.S.?  Finally, what can be learned from the policies and acts that transpired after 
September 11th and about torture and interrogation methods for the future? 
 There are consequences to every action.  The consequences of the hijacked planes 
that destroyed the Twin Towers, flew into the U.S. Pentagon, crashed into a field in 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and contributed to the devastating 2,752 lives taken on 
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September 11, 2001, was an upset, saddened, angry, and invigorated America 
(Hirschkorn 1).  The Bush administration’s response was a pledge to fight a “war on 
terror,” resulting in the invasion of Afghanistan and later, under more questionable 
motives, the invasion of Iraq.  In reaction to the terrorist attacks, the White House felt 
that a rewriting of established laws and agreements in regards to interrogation policies 
was necessary to appropriately fight the perpetrators of September 11th.  The extended 
interrogation policies by the Bush administration’s “war council,” resulted in the creation 
and use of overseas detention centers, “black sites,” and warlord run camps at which 
individuals thought to be a threat to the U.S. and the world, were detained and questioned 
for information.  This resulted in soldiers, guards, MPs, MIs, contractors, the CIA, and 
interrogators following the administration’s newly created policies in regards to detainee 
treatment and interrogations.  The consequences of these actions was the harsh 
interrogation of detainees for information, which amounted to torture, including physical 
harm, psychological trauma, religious slanders, sexual humiliations, solitary confinement,  
sensory deprivation (including light manipulation, temperature extremes, and 
music/white noise), sleep deprivation, hooding, fear by use of dogs, stress positions, 
physical restraints, and in some cases death.  The consequences of these actions include 
no useful information gained, U.S. future prisoners of war in danger, upset freed torture 
victims and their affiliated groups, increased numbers of anti-American extremists, and a 
discredited and tarnished America.   
 The Bush administration’s justifications for the manipulations of laws and the 
torture practices that ensued, was the need after September 11th for actionable and 
accurate information, fast.  This idea is supported in 2005 when Vice Admiral Albert T. 
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Church III, stressed “the need for intelligence in the post-9/11 world, and our enemies’ 
ability to resist interrogation” (McCoy, “Question” 167).  The purpose of this information 
was the other main justification given by the White House, national security: “The object 
for the military interrogations was simple: to get intelligence for use in the war on terror, 
to protect America for the next attack” (Sands 7).    
 The U.S. government had to further justify and make excuses for the torture 
policy they created once photos, testimonies, and reports were unearthed with 
explanations that they were special idiosyncratic instances.  President Bush reacted to the 
accusations of torture that arose by insisting that “…the actions of a few did not reflect 
the conduct of the military as a whole” (Hersh, “Chain” 46).  The administration gave 
additional responses, explaining that “…the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo as 
the unauthorized actions of a few till-trained personnel” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 166), that 
“when cruelties did occur…they were rare mishaps, the result of combat stress and 
insufficient training, or a ‘breakdown of good order and discipline’” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 
189), and that the pictures from Abu Ghraib was “an isolated incident, the work of a few 
‘bad apples’ acting without orders” (I. “Official Sanctions” 1).  Recall however that 
although the lines of authority were blurred, it was stated by Brian Cammack, a former 
specialist with the 377th Military Police Company, that: “Whether they got in trouble or 
not, everybody struck a detainee at some point” (Lasseter, “Day 2” 5).  Therefore the 
“bad apples” excuse and the justification that the abuses were confined to a few guards, 
was not the case at any of the detention centers and was completely false, as I have 
already shown.   
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 In response to investigations concerning U.S. actions at overseas detention centers 
such as the McClatchy and ICRC findings, the Pentagon reacted in 2008 with the 
statement: Military policy always has been to treat detainees humanely, to investigate 
credible complaints of abuse and to hold people accountable” (Lasseter, “Day 1” 3).  The 
Pentagon also referenced Al-Qaeda training manuals such as the Manchester Manual, in 
explaining that the atrocities were not as severe as reported because they were 
fabrications by detainees who were taught to lie about their treatment.  It is written in the 
Manchester Manual that al-Qaeda members must: “Insist on proving that torture was 
inflicted on them by the State Security, (investigators) before the judge” to “complain (to 
the court) of mistreatment while in prison” and “to do his best to know the names of the 
state security officers, who participated in his torture and mention their names to the 
judge” (“Frontline” 8).  The Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing also used this 
justification by stating that “al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists are taught to expect 
Americans to abuse them. They’re recruited based on false propaganda that says the 
United States is out to destroy Islam” (“Senate Armed Services Committee” 1).  The 
hearing additionally stated, however, that torturing detainees is not the answer in that 
“treating detainees harshly only reinforces their distorted view and increases their 
resistance to cooperate” (“Senate Armed Services Committee” 1).   
 It was not until September of 2006 that Bush administration officials began 
admitting to the torture policy they created.  In 2006 the President admitted “that the CIA 
had run a secret global detention and interrogation operation along rules of its own 
making” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 155).  Over two years later, the Bush administration 
revealed its involvement with specific interrogation techniques, such as that of the highly 
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debated issue in 2007 – 2008 of waterboarding.  In February 2008 the “Bush 
administration acknowledged publicly for the first time that it had in fact…used what is 
often considered the most notorious of the US interrogation tactics – waterboarding – on 
three high-value terror suspects, including Zubayda” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 171).  When 
the “war councils” secrets were revealed, the Supreme Court was utilized to determine 
the legality of the Bush administration’s policies and abuses at detention centers.  Finally, 
a section of the U.S. political system showed its ability to uphold the county’s democratic 
principles when “three times in the last four years (2004-2008) the Supreme Court has 
rejected the Bush administration's legal defenses of its program for detention of alleged 
“enemy combatants” (A. Lewis 5).    
 The “ends justify the means” argument was also used as a validation for the 
emergency situation America was in and the torture program that ensued.  When 
evaluating this argument, one must “weigh the tactical value of that paucity of 
intelligence against the enormity of the damage to U.S. international prestige, the cost 
clearly outweighs the benefit” (McCoy, “Question” 202).  A great risk with torture 
methods is the “loss of critical intelligence and time, as well as the United States’ 
reputation abroad and its credibility in demanding the humane treatment of captured 
Americans” (Minter 1).  Mora, one of the few figures within the White House that as 
early as 2002 opposed the creation of the government’s secret torture policy, stated that: 
“Cruelty disfigures our national character. It is incompatible with our constitutional 
order, with our laws, and with our most prized values…Where cruelty exists, law does 
not” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 236).     
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 Despite the Bush administration’s justifications for manipulating and rewriting 
American and international interrogation policies, their actions were illegal and could 
result in a variety of negative repercussions for the country.  The photos from Abu Ghraib 
in 2004 revealed such consequences when Assistant Secretary of State, Michael G. 
Kozak, remarked in February 2005 that “the events at Abu Ghraib were a stain on the 
honor of the US; there’s no two ways about it” (McCoy, “Question” 200).  In July 2005 
in their support of passing of a piece of legislation that would “limit executive authority 
over detainee interrogation,” eleven retired military leaders wrote that the U.S. actions: 
“Hurt America’s cause in the war on terror, endangers US service members who might be 
captured by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have held dear for 
generations” (McCoy, “Question” 185-186). 
 
Nothing Gained 
 
 In addition to the negative repercussions resulting from the U.S. torture policy, 
the information gained has also shown to be inconclusive.  In response to the McClatchy 
findings, the Pentagon responded that valuable information was gained, but refused to 
divulge exactly what information.  The McClatchy report also provided the Pentagon 
with a series of questions and testimonies from 63 former detainees.  The Pentagon’s 
only response was that: “These unlawful combatants have provided valuable information 
in the struggle to protect the U.S. public from an enemy bent on murder of innocent 
civilians,” Col. Gary Keck said in the statement. He provided no examples” (Lasseter, 
“Day 1” 4).     
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 Recall from chapter three Mohammed al-Qahtani, detainee #63, a “high-value” 
prisoner because the FBI suspected him to be the twentieth hijacker on September 11, 
2001.  The U.S. claimed that valuable information was gained from Qahtani, information 
which in 2005 was no longer credible or useful because he officially retracted his 
statements.  The information extracted from Qahtani is believed to have also been false as 
“…records indicate interrogators coerced statements under torture” (Rejali 510).  At the 
onset of Qahtani’s detainment in 2002, he revealed information that displeased the 
interrogators and forced them to perform harsher interrogations on him.  It was later 
discovered that the information he gave at the start of his confinement and interrogations, 
appears to be the truth, but was simply “confirmation of what they (U.S.) had already 
learned from conventional detective work earlier…he only knew about the plan for 9/11. 
He didn’t know where Bin Laden was, or about other plans” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 211).  
It is also understood that most members of al-Qaeda or terrorist networks are not 
entrusted with great amounts of information and usually only know necessary details of 
their missions.  The reason being, that if they are caught, they do not have much 
information to divulge.  In the case of Qahtani, it also appears that he was a late addition 
to the hijackers of September 11th and therefore knew even less information than others.  
Mallow explains that all of the intensified interrogations against Qahtani and others were 
actually a great setback, as he remarked that it “...may have worked against our (US) 
interests…because it was a waste of time” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 211), and was then later 
publicized for the entire world to see how he was treated and tortured by the U.S. 
 Certain detainees that were considered “high-value” such as Qahtani and 
Zubayda, were revealed by the White House to have given the U.S. useful information 
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for the “war on terror.”  Since the release of such information however, further evidence 
has been revealed and many of these instances have been refuted.  Recall that Zubayda 
was classified as a “high-value” detainee and therefore underwent some of the most 
extreme treatment and interrogation methods in order to extract a confession.  It was later 
discovered that he was only “responsible for minor-logistics, for example, travel for Al 
Qaeda wives” and was “mentally deranged” (Rejali 505).  The White House asserted 
however that Zubayda had given valuable information such as revealing terrorists 
“worldwide, leading to their arrests. He described major plots that targeted malls, banks, 
supermarkets, water systems…gave important information leading to the capture of 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and Ramsi bin al-
Shibh, an alleged Al-Qaeda operative” (Rejali 506).  Rejali discredits this knowledge, 
however, explaining that it is similar to previously discovered information obtained 
through sources such as “files of an al-Jazeera reporter” or a “tipster to whom the CIA 
paid a $25 million reward” (Rejali 506).  Mayer also refutes claims of valuable 
information extracted from Zubayda in that if anything, his statements were verifications 
of information the government already knew.  (Claims such as these by the White House 
that have been disproved can be found in Rejali’s book Torture and Democracy, Chapter 
22, “What the Apologists say” and Mayer’s book The Dark Side, Chapter 7, “Inside the 
Black Sites.”)  The efforts and dangers the U.S. exhibited in torturing detainees, further 
shows that information and accurate intelligence are two separate things.  After 
September 11th accurate intelligence was especially difficult to obtain as “harsh 
interrogation, ‘tantamount to torture,’ seems to have produced rather little in the way of 
useful intelligence” (McCoy, “Dark Side” 202).   
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 Torture: An Ineffective Method of Truth Extraction  
 
 Dating as far back as AD 221, the ineffectiveness of torture was understood when 
the Roman lawyer, Ulpian, stated that, “…some will always lie under torture; others will 
‘tell any kind of lie than suffer torture’ and one ‘should not place confidence in torture 
applied to a person’s enemies, because they readily tell lies’” (Rejali 462).  This idea is 
also seen in the 21st century when in the summer of 2008, “15 individuals who served as 
senior interrogators, interviewers and intelligence officials in the United States military, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency” convened at a 
forum hosted by Human Rights First and declared that torture is an “‘unlawful, 
ineffective and counterproductive’ way to gather intelligence” (Minter 1).  It has also 
been revealed that “…torture induces numerous false positives and buries interrogators in 
useless information” (Rejali 500).   
 One of the main arguments against torture is that it produces false confessions and 
unreliable information from detainees.  Cases have shown, including many of those from 
the recent U.S. torture policy, that individuals being tortured will say almost anything to 
stop the pain or humiliation.  The individual being tortured is also known to tell 
information that he/she thinks the interrogator or one torturing wants to hear.  The main 
reason being that in most cases, a prisoner that is being tortured is not “apt to be much of 
a stickler for whether or not his statements are true. Since there is no way to separate the 
true from the false screams, answers given by a suspect under torture are worse than 
worthless and should never form a part of our (US) interrogation policy” (“Does Torture 
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Work” 1).  A senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan supported this claim in that: 
“Treating detainees harshly is actually an impediment – a “‘roadblock’” (“Senate Armed 
Services Committee Hearing” 1).  This information is therefore considered useless 
because time and energy have been wasted on not only extracting the information but 
having to further investigate the validity behind the detainee’s confession.  As shown in 
cases such as Qahtani’s, years have been wasted torturing individuals that will never talk 
or who do not have useful information to divulge.  Coinciding with this notion that 
torture is a “roadblock” is that “intense pain far more often encourages whatever lies the 
detainee thinks his interrogators want to hear. Those lies have sent American forces on 
countless wild goose chases…” (Weissman 3).  In addition to the wasted time, the U.S. 
will also face the negative repercussions from being the torturers while at the same time 
gaining nothing.   
 Many of the torture methods are referred to as “breaking tactics” because results 
have shown that they are more effective in harming a detainee than extracting truthful 
information.  “Breaking tactics” such as blasting loud and offensive music or sleep 
deprivation, are reportedly ineffective as the “results you get from a broken prisoner have 
little to do with truth” (Smith 2).  Marion Bowman, Deputy General Counsel on the 
National Security Law Branch of the FBI, explains that additional torture methods such 
as stress positions, will anger individuals further because “if you are going to cause 
people physical discomfort, they’re going to get pissed off, they aren’t going to talk to 
you as readily” (Sands 118).  In regards to sleep deprivation tactics, which are often used 
for weeks on end, besides being angry, the individuals deprived of sleep will also be 
disoriented.  Over time detainees cannot think straight or cannot determine the difference 
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between the truth and fiction: “The person who is not getting enough sleep isn’t going to 
have coherent thoughts in a very short period of time” (Sands 118). 
 
Future Prisoners of War in Danger 
  
 In addition to being ineffective, torture methods are also unjust and have a range 
of negative repercussions as they are “immoral and they’d ‘set a pattern that was clearly 
going to impact our (U.S.) folks oversees, too, when they were captured’” (Sands 128).  
Brigadier General Mark Kimmit, Deputy Director of coalition operations in Iraq, explains 
this precarious situation: “Our (US) soldiers could be taken prisoner as well. And we 
expect our soldiers to be treated well by the adversary, by the enemy. And if we can’t 
hold ourselves up as an example of how to treat people with dignity and respect…We 
can’t ask that other nations do that to our soldiers as well” (Leung 1).  Much of this 
problem originates from the fact that “there’s a big lack of knowledge about the mind-set 
of extremists. Doing these things just makes them more determined to hate us. And 
eventually they are going to be released. When they are, they’re going to talk and 
exaggerate what happened to them. They’re going to become heroes. So then we’ll have 
more extremist networks and more suicide bombers” (Mayer, “The Experiment” 9-10).  
This former FBI agent also warned that “we (U.S.) can’t go down to the level of our 
enemies…if we do, it’s going to come back at us later on” (Mayer, “The Experiment” 
10).  In an interview, Moazzam Begg, freed torture victim from Bagram, stated: “I was 
kidnapped, abducted, falsely imprisoned, tortured and threatened with further torture, 
without charge, without trial….Soldiers would say, if you were not a terrorist when you 
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came in here, by the time you leave I’m sure you would be because of the way you have 
been treated” (Gibney).  Negative repercussions have already started occurring because 
of the U.S.’s actions at overseas detention centers.  One reported incident happened after 
Newsweek published an article about a particular religious abuse tactic at the Guantanamo 
Bay prison of “flushing the Koran down the toilet” (McCoy, “Question” 179).  The 
backlash of this action was a series of “demonstrations across the Muslim world that left 
seventeen dead in Afghanistan” (McCoy, “Question” 179).     
 Torture is also a technique which once authorized, is easily spread, creating 
further ramifications.  Once the White House extended interrogation methods, they were 
not only instituted at U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan, but also into Iraq nearly two 
years later.  Recall from the previous chapters that the transition of torture techniques 
from the White House to each detention center was not well organized in that 
interrogators were not well trained on the new methods and were often confused about 
which actions were acceptable and what orders they should be following.  The torture 
policy established by America not only spread to U.S. detention centers, but other 
countries as well, as the U.S. was “leading the way in the abuse of prisoners and flouting 
the GC (Geneva Conventions) and international law, it was natural that their allies, such 
as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, would follow suit. These 
countries carried out their own renditions and disappearances of prisoners, undermining 
their own legal processes and opening the way for local rulers to deal with domestic 
political opponents in the same manner” (Rashid 306).      
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Alternatives to Torture 
 
 Torture is an ineffective method of truth extraction not only because it has been 
shown to not obtain actionable intelligence and have extensive negative repercussions, 
but because there are other methods that have given better results.  Rejali explains that 
“there is currently no official report that answers the question: “Does torture work? No 
General Accounting Office report weighs how information from ‘stress and duress’ 
interrogations compares to other intelligence activities” (Rejali 23).  Answering this 
question would be very difficult to test and definitively answer.  However, later in his 
book Rejali references CIA studies and information which reveal that “it is better to build 
a relationship of trust…than to extract quick confessions through tactics such as those 
used by the Nazis and the Soviets…Torture undermines precisely this trust and makes it 
difficult to recruit informants for intelligence purposes” (Rejali 503).   
 One of the most referenced methods in obtaining actionable intelligence is that of 
gaining trust and attempting to connect with a detainee, or rapport.  Evidence suggests 
that a “key principle” of interrogation is that it “only produces results if rapport is created 
between the interrogator and the detainee” (Sands 7).  Ways in which rapport can be 
gained have been explained by a “private association of United States Marine Corps 
members” who begin by stating the importance of an interrogator to be culturally aware: 
“Know their language, know their culture, and treat the captured enemy as a human 
being” (Budiansky 2).  The prisoner must then feel comfortable and in a “safe place, 
where even he knows…that it is all over. Then forget, as it were, the “enemy” stuff, and 
the “prisoner” stuff. I (interrogator) tell them to forget it, telling them I am talking as a 
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human being to a human being.  (Budiansky 2).  Attempting to remove the detainee from 
the situation, remove all outside barriers and relate as equals is one of the first steps in 
gaining rapport.  The Marines then explained to “begin by asking him things about 
himself. Make him and his troubles the center of the stage” (Bidiansky 2).  He explains 
that this can be achieved because “every soldier…has a ‘story’ he desperately wants to 
tell. The interrogator’s job is to provide the atmosphere that allows the prisoner to tell it” 
(Budiansky 2).  In order to get to this story, the Marines suggest that the interrogator get 
“into the mind and heart of the prisoner” to create “an intellectual and spiritual rapport 
with him” (Budiansky 3).  The Marines compiled this information through examination 
of past interrogation sessions with Japanese POW’s.  The information showed that “the 
successful interrogators all had one thing in common in the way they approached their 
subjects. They were nice to them” (Budiansky 1).  Torture specifically eliminates 
building a relationship and “being nice” to detainees, believing that pain and punishment 
will be a quicker, more reliable approach to getting information.   
 A setback to gaining rapport is that it takes time.  Building rapport is a slow 
process, is complicated when language and cultural barriers exist, difficult when the 
individual is kept prisoner by the interrogator, and hard when the interrogator is 
considered the enemy.  In order to obtain actionable intelligence from a detainee who 
often is the enemy, who has been trained against divulging information, and who has a 
different language and culture from the interrogator, it takes patience and is time 
consuming.  Torture, is believed to be a fast way to obtain information especially when 
compared to the effort and time needed to gain rapport.  Although torture may be quick, 
recall that the information is usually false as detainees will often say what he/she thinks 
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the interrogator wants to hear.  It is also believed that “very few individuals have enough 
information to make torture worthwhile, and those who do are the least likely, for 
obvious reasons, to fall into the interrogator’s net, or to talk when they do” (McCoy, 
“Question” 197).  The underlying argument is that although gaining rapport is time 
consuming, the results surpass those behind torture, including greater actionable 
intelligence without the extensive negative consequences that torture produces.  
 
“Ticking Time Bomb” 
 
 One of the only times torture is explained as an effective interrogation technique, 
is in the “ticking time bomb” scenario.  In this situation, an individual is being 
interrogated who is believed to have control over, or knowledge of, a devise or weapon 
that could kill people if not stopped.  In the “ticking time bomb” situation, there is a 
limited amount of time until the devise is detonated and people are killed.  For this 
reason, the information is needed very fast.  This means that the more accurate, but time 
consuming method of gaining rapport, is not applicable.  The solution is therefore torture, 
with the justification that information is needed fast and if one life is harmed in the 
process of saving many others, than it is worth it.  Alan Dershowitz, Harvard Law 
Professor, explains the exact circumstances behind this situation: “If you’ve got the 
ticking bomb case, the case of the terrorist who knew precisely where and when the bomb 
would go off, and it was the only way of saving 500 or 1,000 lives, every democratic 
society would, have, and will use torture” (McCoy, “Question” 111).  As of February 
2009, the “ticking time bomb” scenario is a nonexistent situation however, as never in 
 79
history has the case arisen.  Furthermore, in the “ticking time bomb” situation, not only is 
the probability of finding the individual with valuable information very minute, but so is 
the chance that the person will divulge the information, because “if a guy is that 
committed, he will probably die for it” (Gibney).   
 Torture, on the surface may appear like a useful truth extraction method.  Scholars 
and intelligence officials that examine past torture cases and the current U.S. torture 
policy however, reveal that torture may only be effective if done right after capture by 
trained professionals.  Once time has passed or interrogators are not as well trained, then 
the chance of extracting actionable information greatly decreases or the information is 
less important.  Trained interrogation professionals even have difficulty in obtaining 
accurate information from someone in that there is a “torturer’s paradox:” “Don’t wait 
too long, but don’t torture right away. Don’t make the prisoner faint or die, but push to 
the max. Don’t desensitize the prisoner, but hit hard. Look before you leap, but he who 
hesitates is lost. Under these conditions, Kubark (CIA interrogation manual) concludes, 
torture is a “hit or miss” practice and “a waste of time and energy” (Rejali 477).    
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Conclusion 
 
Moving Forward 
“Congress doesn’t have the power to ‘tie the president’s hands in regards to torture as 
an interrogation technique…it’s the core of the commander in chief function. They can’t 
prevent the President from ordering torture” – John Yoo   
  
“As of September 2006 the number of detainees reached 86,000. None of them were 
convicted” – Taxi to the Dark Side 
 
 There are even greater implications to the Bush administration’s torture policy 
than the brutalities and negative ramifications that resulted.  When examining the torture 
policy in its entirety, it must first be understood how it was created.  With all of the 
domestic and international laws and agreements regarding the treatment of prisoners, 
which ban inhumane acts especially those involving torture, how did the Bush 
administration even create a torture policy?   
 The U.S. torture policy was created when the “war council” increased Presidential 
prerogative power after September 11th.  Recall the precarious situation the government 
and country suffered following the terrorist attacks.  The White House response was a 
“war on terror” in which President Bush was given a mandate to do anything necessary.  
It has long been felt by Congress and the Supreme Court that security and international 
policy, especially in emergency situations, should be predominately controlled by the 
commander in chief, the President.  This power of the executive branch, however, is 
supposed to be limited by cores of the democratic government-the system of checks and 
balances-which is meant to ensure that no branch of government is ever too powerful.    
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 The power of the presidency was taken advantage of by the OLC who stated that 
“the commander in chief…had inherent powers to order any interrogation technique he 
chose. Under this interpretation, US laws and treaties banning torture-despite having been 
signed into law by earlier presidents-were deemed unconstitutional and therefore null. By 
this logic, the President was literally above the law” (Mayer, “Dark Side” 152).   The 
“war council’s” actions after September 11, 2001, which gave the President all 
encompassing power as well as a mandate to perform whatever actions necessary, was 
complete “disrespect for the rule of law and the constructive role it plays” (Harris).  No 
democratic constitution or “military necessity” situation would ever allow a President, or 
any individual for that matter, to have unlimited power, especially a power that was so 
wrongly abused and that allowed a practice as ineffective, inhumane, and with such 
negative ramifications as that of torture. 
 Information revealing the exact number of prisoners abused while detained by the 
U.S. remains currently unavailable.  However, just one month into the Obama 
administration, there has already been a drastic increase in the number of detainee 
testimonies, court cases, and lawsuits.  For nearly the first four years following the 
September 11th attacks, the Bush administration, for the most part, was able to pursue 
their torture policy without much opposition.  With the broadcast of the April 2004 
photos from Abu Ghraib and investigations about prisoner treatment at detention centers, 
a slow shift in opposition to the Bush administration’s policies eventuated.  Originally, 
the opposition came predominately from inside the White House, but as time passed, 
lawsuits were filed, more investigations and testimonies were exposed, and cases were 
brought before the Supreme Court.   
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 Instances of court cases brought to the Supreme Court concerning the Bush 
administration’s torture policy include: “In 2004, in Rasul v. Bush, a 6–3 majority held 
that prisoners at Guantánamo could test the legality of their detention by petitioning in 
federal courts for writs of habeas corpus. In 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a 5–3 majority 
held that trials of prisoners before military commissions under rules laid down by the 
Bush administration were unlawful because limits on the rights of defendants violated the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. This June (2008), in 
Boumediene v. Bush, a 5–4 majority held that a congressional statute barring habeas 
corpus petitions by Guantánamo detainees violated the Constitution's guarantee of the 
right to habeas corpus” (A. Lewis 5). The undermining of the Bush administration’s 
policies continued in June 2006 when the Supreme Court ruled “that foreign detainees 
held for years at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba have the right to appeal to U.S. civilian courts 
to challenge their indefinite imprisonment without charges” (“Supreme Court” 1). 
 Coinciding with this ruling, the Supreme Court in December 2008 ordered a court 
in Washington DC to reevaluate its dismissal of a “lawsuit against former Defense 
secretary Donald Rumsfeld and 10 senior US military officers” (US Supreme Court 
Orders” 1).  The case concerned “four former British detainees at the Guantanamo Bay 
military prison” and the torture and abuses they received while imprisoned (“US Supreme 
Court Orders” 1).  Continuing the challenges opposing the Bush administration’s 
policies, in February 2009, the Senate Intelligence Committee announced its intention to 
begin an investigation of the CIA’s covert interrogation program.  The investigation is 
“aimed at uncovering new information on the origins of the programs as well as 
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scrutinizing how they were executed-including the conditions at clandestine CIA prison 
sites and the interrogation regimens used to break Al Qaeda suspects” (Miller 1).   
 One of the recently revealed prisoner testimonies is that of British resident 
Binyam Mohamed, who was detained in U.S. custody for nearly seven years.  Mohamed 
was charged with “plotting a radioactive ‘dirty bomb’ attack against the United States” 
but since then, has been dismissed of all charges (Sullivan 1).  Mohammed stated that 
some of the torture methods practiced on him included the slicing of his “chest and 
genitals with a scalpel” and being “chained in total darkness with a single rap music 
album, by the U.S. artist Eminem, blaring 24 hours a day” (Sullivan 1-2).  To cease the 
brutalities against him, Mohammed claimed he “made false confessions to the dirty-bomb 
plot, to obtaining a false passport from 9/11 plotter Khalid Sheik Mohammed, and to 
having met Osama bin Laden 30 times” (Sullivan 2).  These claims have since been 
dismissed as lies that were coerced through torture.   
 While these court cases and lawsuits are being filed at rapid rates, more and more 
detainees, guards, and interrogators, are coming forth with their stories, providing a 
constant influx of new information which will soon be presented and leaked to the media. 
An article published on March 4, 2009 discussed the recent release of seven memos from 
the Bush administration which provided “‘legal’ rationales for the president to suspend 
freedom of speech and press; order warrantless searches and seizures, including wiretaps 
of US citizens; lock up US citizens indefinitely in the United States without criminal 
charges; send suspected terrorists to other countries where they will likely be tortured; 
and unilaterally arrogate treaties” (Cohn 1).  This further shows how the Bush 
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administration believed they had the authority to break established laws, especially those 
concerning human rights. 
 It must not become a characterization of the U.S. government that the President 
has complete power to override the law.  Although much of the President’s and 
government’s power is defined by interpretation, such inhumane instances must not be 
interpreted haphazardly, especially in times of distress.  Interpretations need to be in 
accordance with the principles set forth in the constitution and those established by 
democratic states.  The Bush administration failed to adhere to these standards; instead 
they used the excuses of “military necessity” and “war on terror” to legitimize any and all 
of their violence and manipulation of the law.  America must trust the system of 
government created by its founding fathers and abide by not only laws and agreements 
but human codes of morality and justice as well.    
 It is a fact that in the 21st century, war has become far more dangerous and deadly 
as entire populations can be disintegrated in seconds.  A new type of warfare exists where 
no longer are countries equipped with cannons and rifles but instead, equipped with 
chemical and biological weapons.  These are weapons of mass destruction-weapons 
which in their name, signify their possible degree of destruction.  The threat of anti-
American extremists and rouge states is a reality that the U.S. and world must be aware 
of, not antagonize, but secure against.  The justification of military necessity because of 
an emergency situation is not one to be taken lightly, but rather all aspects of the 
decision, actions, and consequences need to be evaluated and taken seriously.  The U.S. 
did not take enough time.  Instead, within days of the attacks, they declared a preemptive 
“war on terror” without evaluating other solutions.  Furthermore, America’s decision to 
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evoke a “war on terror” was not efficiently planned and properly executed.  This resulted 
in the U.S. being ill prepared for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.   
 In the current state of America and the world, it could be argued that nearly the 
entire global community is in a “state of emergency,” and therefore any, and all actions 
are justified in the name of “military necessity” and security.  The term “military 
necessity” is not one to be used lightly and most of all, not frequently.  Countries around 
the world and especially the U.S., who perceives itself as the most powerful nation in the 
world, need to understand that there is no such thing as an “unlimited war” and certainly, 
no such thing in democratic law as “unlimited power.” 
 One of the greatest issues behind these misinterpretations is that too many 
countries believe that violence is the answer.  When will the U.S. along with the rest of 
the world learn that violence cannot be retaliated with more violence?  What other 
solutions exist besides a “war on terror?”  Responding to violence with violence only 
creates more death, anger, sadness, and in turn the need to respond back with greater 
violence: “…these terrorist attacks were constructed as “declarations of war” by the Bush 
administration, which then positioned the military response as a justified act of self-
defense” (Butler 4).  The problem with the U.S. response to September 11th is that the 
country did not carefully evaluate the issue and understand the reasoning behind the 
attacks.  Additionally, those that attempted to understand the basis behind the attacks 
were considered “anti-American” and as feeling “sympathy with terrorism, or that one 
saw the terror as justified” (Butler 3).   
 The U.S. ignored “its image as the hated enemy for many in the region” and 
rather “responded as a militaristic power with no respect for lives outside of the First 
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World. That we (U.S.) now respond with more violence is taken as “further proof” that 
the United States has violent and anti-sovereign designs on the region” (Butler 17).  
America’s response, instead of reducing such anti-American sentiment, has only 
provoked it, and perhaps raised it to a greater level.  The U.S. claimed “to have gone to 
war in order to ‘root out’ the sources of terror, according to Bush, but do we (U.S.) think 
that finding the individuals responsible for the attacks on the United States will constitute 
having gotten to the root? Do we (U.S.) not imagine that the invasion of a sovereign 
country with a substantial Muslim population, supporting the military regime in Pakistan 
that actively and violently suppresses free speech, obliterating lives and villages and 
homes and hospitals, will not foster more adamant and widely disseminated anti-
American sentiment and political organizing? (Butler 8).  
 In my opinion, violence cannot be justified.   One can never have enough security 
or feel completely secure and therefore must look to other, more peaceful solutions, in 
order to achieve this safety.  Alternative solutions to violence include working on 
establishing and maintaining peaceful relations with other countries.  Great opportunities 
exist for America and other nations in the world to unite on a peaceful and more 
proactive ground.  International policy needs to be re-evaluated on a global level and the 
U.S. can and should be at the forefront of such progress.  Recall from chapter one how 
America, since its founding has placed itself above inhumane and immoral acts such as 
torture.  On May 10, 2007, U.S. General David Petraeus wrote to his troops that: “Our 
values and the laws governing warfare teach us to respect human dignity, maintain our 
integrity, and do what is right. Adherence to our values distinguishes us from our enemy. 
This fight depends on securing the population, which must understand that we-not our 
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enemies-occupy the moral high ground…What sets us apart from our enemies in this 
fight, however, is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards 
and values that dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and 
respect. While we are warriors, we are also human beings” (Leung 12-13).  Although it 
may be a long and difficult process for the United States to regain its position as one of 
the most powerful and respected countries in the world, it is not impossible if the nation 
abides by national and international laws and aligns with other countries to find the 
“moral high ground.”    
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